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1Introduction and Summary
Traditional models of economic decision making assume that individuals act rationally,
purely self-interested, and maximize their material payoffs. For the most part of the
last century, economists have predicted economic behavior based on these assumptions.
Meanwhile, behavioral economics has provided ample evidence about non-rational
and social behavior by incorporating insights from psychology into economic research
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Laboratory experiments
have played an important role in accumulating this rigorous empirical evidence and are
nowadays accepted as a major source of knowledge in economics (Falk and Heckman,
2009). Similar to medical studies that employ placebos, economic experiments
implement exogenous treatment variations, which offers tight control over potentially
confounding factors of influence and thus allows drawing causal inferences.
This dissertation reports results from three laboratory experiments that involve
“behavioral regularities”, i.e., systematic deviations from behavior implied by tradi-
tional economic theory. One economically relevant domain in which these behavioral
regularities matter is immoral behavior. Over decades, economists have assumed
that individuals act perfectly immoral if this serves their material self-interest. How-
ever, the recent literature in economics and psychology has provided clean evidence
that people often refrain from immoral behavior (e.g., Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
2013). Contributing to this literature, Chapter 2 examines inequalities that might
arise due to cheating. In particular, I focus on how these inequalities affect people’s
preferences for redistribution. How do people’s views on redistributive policies change
when they suspect that the “rich” acquired their wealth by means of cheating? Chap-
ter 3 also concerns the domain of immoral decision making. An open question in
1
the literature is whether people justify their dishonesty by shifting responsibility to
another person’s choice. Are individuals more likely to lie at the expense of another
person if this other person self-selected into a situation where being lied to is possible?
The notion underlying this justification is that people are responsible for outcomes
which result from their own choices if a different choice would have yielded a different
outcome (Dworkin, 1981a,b).
In addition to immoral behavior, responsibility is also subject to behavioral
regularities. Traditional economic models assume that individuals are not intrinsically
concerned about who is responsible for an economic outcome. However, typically,
it is considered to be fair to hold people responsible for the outcomes that result
from their actions (Cappelen et al., 2016). This may be difficult as many situations
entail uncertainty about people’s actions, which leaves room for holding someone
responsible for a certain outcome. For instance, responsibility for economic success
or failure can either be attributed to an individual’s action, e.g. high effort, or to
external factors, e.g. demand or supply shocks. Related to this, Chapter 4 investigates
non-rational responsibility attribution to refugees — a group which has become
increasingly important for many developed economies — by asking: Do natives blame
refugees for negative economic events?
As argued above, this thesis documents effects and determinants of inequality,
immoral behavior, and responsibility by providing experimental evidence on behav-
ioral regularities. In the remainder of Chapter 1, I summarize the following three
chapters of this dissertation. Each of these chapters is self-contained and, thus, can
be read independently. Each chapter’s appendix follows after the chapter’s main text,
while the references are presented at the end of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2. Different views on the necessity of redistributive policies rest upon
the sources of inequality. Supporters of left-wing parties typically argue that unequal
outcomes considerably emerge due to circumstances beyond individual control and
thus place more emphasis on redistribution than right-wing voters (e.g., Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005). I investigate whether this difference in tolerating inequality is
amplified by suspicious success — achievements that may arise from cheating.
Prominent examples of fraudulent behavior revealed by the “Panama Papers”
and the “Paradise Papers” have shown that a substantial fraction of global financial
wealth is generated by dishonest means. According to recent estimations, tax eva-
sion of this kind results in annually forgone tax revenues of $190 billion (Zucman,
2014). This might leave people suspicious about the wealth of the very successful.
Another prominent example of cheating that leads to suspicious success is doping in
professional sports. People may be skeptical about athletes’ performances at the Tour
de France or the Olympic Games because their achievements seem just to good to be
true.
I investigate the question of how suspicious success affects redistributive pref-
erences using a laboratory experiment. For this purpose, I exogenously vary cheating
opportunities for stakeholders who work on a real effort task and earn money accord-
ing to their self-reported performances. An impartial spectator may redistribute the
earnings between the stakeholders. In the control condition, stakeholders are per-
fectly monitored and thus cannot cheat. In contrast, stakeholders are able to overstate
their performances in the treatment condition. Importantly, dishonest stakeholders
cannot be identified. Hence, spectators might speculate about suspicious success when
observing large income differences in the treatment condition, but they do not know
whether this suspicion is justified. This is why, in the presence of potential cheating,
some spectators might eliminate inequalities, while others refrain from doing so.
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I find that the opportunity to cheat leads to different views on whether to
accept inequality. Left-wing spectators substantially reduce inequality when cheating
is possible, while the treatment has no significant effect on choices of right-wing
spectators. Furthermore, left-wing spectators’ decisions are affected by cheating
opportunities only in situations with high pre-redistribution inequality, i.e., cases
when one might become suspicious about the success of a high performer. This
provides evidence for the mechanism of the treatment effect. Left-wing spectators
seem to redistribute more in the treatment condition because they suspect the “rich”
to be cheating.
My setup enables me to distinguish between three different explanations for
the polarization of redistributive preferences: (i) differences in beliefs about cheating,
(ii) differences in whether spectators find cheating acceptable (i.e., norms), and
(iii) mere differences in the preference for redistribution when the source of income
inequality is unclear (cheating versus honest performance). Since neither beliefs nor
norms about cheating are significantly different across the two political camps, my
findings seem to be driven by a difference in preferences. These results suggest that
redistributive preferences will diverge even more once public awareness increases
that inequality may be to a certain extent created by cheating.
Chapter 3. Recent research on dishonesty suggests that people want to keep
a positive image of themselves when engaging in lying behavior (e.g., Mazar et al.,
2008; Abeler et al., 2016). Therefore, they must come up with excuses for dishonesty.
Together with Florian Loipersberger, I set up a laboratory experiment to study whether
the presence of a choice is used as such an excuse.
Choices become increasingly prevalent in most developed economies through
the extension of market mechanisms to various aspects of life (Cappelen et al., 2016).
For instance, nowadays, people ought to choose between different investments for
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their retirement savings, while a couple of years ago, many governments took full
responsibility for their citizen’s retirement benefits. Despite the many advantages of
free choices, they might increase the chances of being lied to. Consider, for example,
a bank employee who offers several financial products to a customer. The bank
employee does not recommend the best fitting option but the one that leaves her with
the highest commission in order to maximize her income. To convince herself of her
action being morally acceptable, she brings to her mind that the customer was free to
choose a different bank at any point in time.
We address this issue by conducting a laboratory experiment where a potential
liar can lie at the cost of another participant (the “other participant”). The other
participant faces two options: interacting with the potential liar or receiving an alter-
native payment. In our control condition, the other participant is randomly assigned
to one of these two options. In contrast, he chooses between these alternatives in our
treatment condition.
We find that the introduction of a choice leads to a positive but insignificant
increase in the probability of behaving dishonestly. Following the large literature on
gender differences in dishonesty (e.g., Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Grosch and
Rau, 2017), we investigate whether this results holds for both genders separately. Self-
selection of the other participant has no significant effect on lying decisions of females.
For men, however, we find a significant treatment effect of about 56% increased
dishonesty. Thus, our results suggest that some males excuse their dishonest behavior
by shifting responsibility for the outcome to the choice of the other participant.
Chapter 4. This chapter is joint work with Stefan Grimm. We investigate
whether people blame refugees for negative events. The large inflow of refugees
to Europe in the last couple of years has revived the heated political debate about
whether and how to integrate refugees. The content of this debate is highly relevant in
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economic terms, as, for instance, the future of labor markets in many Western societies
depends on the integration of refugees. While a large part of this discussion focuses
on whether refugees can be held responsible for negative events such as rising crime
and unemployment rates, surprisingly little is known about how natives attribute
responsibility towards refugees.
We propose a novel experimental paradigm to measure discrimination in respon-
sibility attribution towards Arabic refugees. In our experiment, German participants
are either paired with another German or a refugee. These German participants
experience a positive or negative income shock, which is with equal probability caused
by a random draw or another participant’s performance in a real effort task. Responsi-
bility attribution is measured by beliefs about whether the shock is due to the other
participant’s performance or the random draw. Moreover, to investigate whether our
results are driven by statistical discrimination, we elicit beliefs about the partner’s
performance.
We find evidence for reverse discrimination. Germans attribute responsibility
more favorably to refugees than to other Germans. In particular, refugees are less
often held responsible for negative income shocks. Since neither actual performance
differences nor beliefs about Germans’ and refugees’ performances can explain our
finding of reverse discrimination, we rule out statistical discrimination as the driving
force. Moreover, we find that Germans with negative implicit associations towards
Arabic names attribute responsibility less favorably to refugees than Germans with
positive associations. This indicates that implicit associations, which have predictive
power for relevant field behavior such as hiring decisions (Greenwald et al., 2009),
are positively related to explicit attribution behavior towards refugees.
Our findings cannot be explained by standard economic theory since German
participants are willing to forgo parts of their earnings in order to attribute respon-
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sibility favorably to refugees. Instead, we suggest to interpret our findings with
explanations based on theories of self-image and identity concerns. These theories
assume that people want to view themselves as behaving in line with a positive
self-image, which can result in self-serving beliefs about other people (Di Tella et al.,
2015). Applied to our setting, assuming that our participants care about not being
someone who discriminates refugees, identity concerns are likely to explain our result
of reverse discrimination.
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2Suspicious Success —Cheating, Inequality
Acceptance, and Political
Preferences
2.1 Introduction
Whether unequal outcomes are considered to be fair primarily depends on the sources
of inequality. People prefer to eliminate income disparities that have resulted from
factors beyond individual control such as pure luck, physical handicap, gender, or
family background, yet they tend to accept inequalities based on differences in effort,
initiative, or the willingness to take risks (Konow, 2000; Fong, 2001; Cappelen et
al., 2013a; Möllerström et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2016). The sources of inequality
also lie at the core of the political debate about redistribution. Whereas right-wingers
believe that one’s fortunes are mainly the consequences of effort and choices, left-
wingers place more emphasis on the notion that uncontrollable luck determines
income (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2010; Cappelen
et al., 2016).
In this chapter, I investigate whether the difference in redistributive preferences
between the two political camps persists with regard to another source of inequality —
cheating. Because everyday life is permeated with cheating opportunities, ranging
from an employee tempted to overstate hours worked to potential submission of false
claims by a physician, people might be suspicious of the wealth of the successful. For
example, the recent leaks of the “Panama Papers” as well as the “Paradise Papers”
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have revealed that a large fraction of global financial wealth is held in tax havens.1
Zucman (2014) estimates that annually foregone tax revenues due to offshore tax
evasion amount to $190 billion, which suggests that a significant share of wealth is
created by illegal financial activities.2
A particular feature of inequalities which arise from fraudulent behavior is that
although cheating is within individual control, it is, as opposed to effort, unlikely
to be regarded as fair (e.g., Kirchler et al., 2003). Therefore, it remains an open
question whether left-wingers also demand more redistribution than right-wingers
in the presence of cheating opportunities. However, with regard to the prevalence
of suspicious success, this question needs to be answered in order to understand the
origins of different views on the necessity of redistributive policies.
I address this question by conducting a between-subjects experiment, where
some participants work on a real effort task (henceforth called stakeholders). Two
stakeholders are matched with another and split a fixed amount of money according
to their performances. Stakeholders can overstate their performance in the Cheat
treatment, which does not affect the total income of the two stakeholders but shifts
the distribution of income in favor of the misreporting stakeholder. This captures
the impact of cheating behavior in many situations of economic relevance. For
instance, tax evasion does not alter the amount of money necessary to provide public
goods, but at the same time honest tax payers bear the cost of cheating in the long
1See, e.g., http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41880153, last accessed on March 5, 2018.
2Inequalities based on cheating are not limited to tax evasion, but there are various other
forms of performance cheating that cause someone to be more successful than others. For instance,
businessmen fabricate their curriculum vitae to get better paid jobs, athletes take performance
enhancing doping substances to win prestigious competitions, and firms manipulate software to
maximize profits. (see, e.g., http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2669969/CV-fake-
hired-Myer-considered-companies.html, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/
cycling/lancearmstrong/9810199/Lance-Armstrong-tells-Oprah-Winfrey-he-doped-during-
all-seven-Tour-de-France-victories.html, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/
business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html, last accessed on
March 5, 2018).
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run. Contrary to the Cheat treatment, stakeholders’ performances are audited in the
Monitor treatment, which renders misreporting impossible.
Third-party participants (henceforth called spectators) are able to redistribute
the earnings of the two stakeholders (following Cappelen et al., 2013a). In both
treatments, they are fully aware of the rules for working on the real effort task and
the (lacking) possibility to misreport own performance. Importantly, in the Cheat
treatment, dishonest stakeholders cannot be identified, and spectators thus never
know whether a stakeholder reported untruthfully. Therefore, if one of the two
stakeholders earns considerably more than the other one, spectators might believe
that high income results from cheating but do not know whether their suspicion is
accurate. This uncertainty leaves room to justify both eliminating inequalities as well
as refraining from doing so.
Using a laboratory experiment allows to provide clean evidence on the effect
of cheating opportunities on inequality acceptance for two main reasons. First, it
allows for exogenous manipulation of the availability to cheat, which is difficult to
achieve in field settings given the nature of naturally occurring cheating opportunities.
Second, eliciting redistributive preferences from impartial spectators makes it possible
to exclude confounding factors such as selfishness, self-centered inequality aversion
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993).
My results show that the treatment effect depends on political preferences.
Right-wing spectators hesitate to redistribute on the basis of potential cheating as they
implement the same levels of inequality in Monitor and Cheat. In contrast, distributive
choices of left-wing spectators reveal an increase of 74% in inequality reduction due
to cheating opportunities. The analysis of the treatment effect for different levels of
pre-redistribution inequality shows that left-wing spectators react to potential cheating
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only for high levels of inequality. This provides evidence that they believe that the
“rich” stakeholder is cheating in these situations.
There are essentially three different explanations for the polarization in redis-
tributive preferences between the two political camps. (i) Right-wing spectators might
believe to a lesser extent that stakeholders are cheating than left-wingers. (ii) Right-
wing spectators’ norms about cheating differ from those of left-wing supporters: They
find it more acceptable to cheat when possible. (iii) Right-wingers prefer not to redis-
tribute due to potential cheating if they do not know whether a stakeholder indeed
cheated, although they know that misreporting is prevalent. In order to distinguish
between these three explanations, I examine beliefs and norms about cheating and
find no differences between left-wingers and right-wingers. Therefore, the political
divide in how to deal with unequal outcomes that might arise from dishonest behav-
ior seems to reflect different preferences. This suggests that different views on the
importance of redistributive policies diverge even more in the light of scandals about
cheating by the “rich and successful” as we know that redistributive preferences are
highly elastic to information (Kuziemko et al., 2015).
This chapter contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to
studies on the determinants of redistributive preferences. Papers that use survey data
find that personal characteristics such as gender, race, and education as well as cultural
background and past experience of personal traumas (e.g., divorce, hospitalization,
or death of a relative) predict redistributive preferences (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005;
Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Moreover, using data from the General Social Survey,
Fong (2001) shows that people who believe that luck causes poverty and wealth
support redistribution to a much larger extent than people who believe that effort
causes poverty and wealth. In addition, experimental studies indicate that people
also care about whether someone can be held responsible for one’s own luck by
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choosing a risky or a safe option (Cappelen et al., 2013a; Möllerström et al., 2015).
Closely related to this chapter, Bortolotti et al. (2017) experimentally investigate
redistributive preferences when cheating with regard to a risky outcome, a coin flip,
is possible. The authors document a shift in fairness views due to potential cheating
in favor of strict egalitarianism, i.e., implementing an equal distribution of income
independent of subjects’ choices that affected earnings in the first place. Importantly,
while Bortolotti et al. (2017) study redistributive preferences in the light of cheating
in the luck domain, I focus on situations where people can cheat regarding their
performance.
Second, my results show that political preferences matter for accepting inequal-
ities that might arise from cheating behavior. Interestingly, the evidence on whether
political preferences affect choices in allocation decisions is mixed. While a number
of studies report significant differences across political preferences (Van Lange et al.,
2012; Cappelen et al., 2013a; Cappelen et al., 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2017), there
are two studies that find only weakly significant or insignificant effects of political
preferences (Frohlich et al., 1984; Fehr et al., 2006). Therefore, the impact of political
preferences on distributional choices seems to depend on the specific context.
Third, giving participants the opportunity to cheat relates this chapter to a
growing experimental literature on dishonesty (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al.,
2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014; Conrads and
Lotz, 2015; Houser et al., 2016).3 While this literature is primarily concerned with
the extent and the causes of cheating, my study is one of the few that deal with
the consequences of cheating by showing that dishonesty affects the behavior of
third parties (Pigors and Rockenbach, 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2017; Cappelen et al.,
2017).
3See Abeler et al. (2016) for a meta-study on data from 72 experimental studies on dishonesty.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes
the experimental design in detail. Section 2.3 presents the results and Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two main parts. Part 1 concerns the real effort provision
and potential cheating in the matrix task, which was introduced in the literature
by Mazar et al. (2008). Part 2 uses decisions from impartial spectators in order to
measure redistributive preferences, similar to Cappelen et al. (2013a). Thereafter,
beliefs and political preferences are elicited.
2.2.1 Part 1: The Matrix Task
All subjects receive an exercise sheet with 20 matrices, each containing a set of twelve
numbers with two decimal places (see Appendix 2.5.4.1 for an example). Only two of
these twelve numbers add up to exactly 10. The task is to find these two numbers and
solve as many matrices as possible within 6 minutes.
Two players A (the stakeholders) are randomly matched in order to determine
their preliminary income (i.e., income before redistribution). Proportionally to their
performance in the matrix task, e10 are split up among these two participants. This
distribution of income is rounded to 50 cents.
Treatment variation. After working on the task, the stakeholders are provided
with the correct solutions on their screens and are asked to compare them with their
own solutions (see Figure 2.7 in the Appendix for an example of the stakeholders’
decision screen). They then report for each matrix whether they solved it correctly.
Subjects in Monitor are informed that all exercise sheets are collected to verify their
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reported performance and that, if necessary, their reports will be changed to their
actual performance.4 In contrast, subjects in Cheat are informed that they will shred
their exercise sheet at the end of the experiment, and it is thus impossible to monitor
their solutions.
The design of Part 1 has at least three desirable features for the purpose of this
chapter. First, the real effort task mimics a wide range of field settings where people
engage in performance cheating in order to serve their self-interests. Consider, for
instance, an employee who misreports his number of hours worked to receive either
a higher wage or more days off. Second, exaggerating own performance implies a
negative externality for the other stakeholder, which reflects the adverse consequences
of cheating in many “real-world” situations. Coming back to the example of overstating
hours worked, honest colleagues might be affected through a lower likelihood of
being promoted due to inferior relative performance. Third, having a fixed sum
of payments for the two stakeholders excludes efficiency concerns as a motivation
for cheating. This is important for redistribution decisions because if cheating was
efficiency enhancing, this might confound the moral assessment of such behavior and
it would be difficult to account for this motive in the experiment.
2.2.2 Part 2: Redistribution Decisions
Each player B (the spectator) is matched with a pair of stakeholders. The strategy
method is used for the spectators’ decisions. Hence, for each of the eleven possible
distributions of preliminary income (going in steps of 50 cents from maximum in-
equality in the case of (10,0) to full equality in the case of (5,5)), they can transfer
money within a pair of stakeholders and consequently determine the two stakeholders’
4The fraction of stakeholders for whom performances had to be corrected downwards is 10%
(upwards 5%). In 57% of these cases, the difference between reported and actual performance was
one task.
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final income (i.e., income after redistribution).5 Redistribution of the preliminary
income is possible in steps of 10 cents. In order to be able to unambiguously refer to
the stakeholders’ final income, the stakeholder with the higher or equal preliminary
income is called player A1 and the other stakeholder player A2 (see Figure 2.8 in the
Appendix for the spectators’ decision screen).
Spectators receive a fixed income of e10 for their redistribution decisions.
Giving spectators at least the sum of earnings of a pair of stakeholders assures that
self-centered inequity aversion based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) does not affect
spectators’ behavior.6 Moreover, spectators are informed that either their decision or
the decision of another spectator will be randomly implemented, which is designed to
increase the number of decisions taken by spectators.7
2.2.3 Belief Elicitation
After stakeholders report their performance and spectators make their redistribution
decisions, two beliefs are elicited. First, stakeholders and spectators are asked to guess
the average reported performance of the stakeholders in their own session (belief-own-
treat). Consequently, subjects in Monitor report their belief about how many tasks
were actually solved, while subjects in Cheat guess how many tasks the stakeholders
reported to have solved. Second, I elicit beliefs about how many correctly solved
tasks the stakeholders reported in the respective other treatment (belief-other-treat).
Therefore, subjects are informed that stakeholders worked on exactly the same task in
a previously run experiment but that reported performance was monitored differently
5Brandts and Charness (2011) provide an analysis of 29 studies in order to compare the strategy
method with the direct respond method. Since they do not find a single case in which there is a
treatment effect using the strategy method that vanishes with the direct respond method, the strategy
method is likely to yield a lower bound for this experiment’s treatment effect.
6For instance, the Fehr-Schmidt model predicts the spectator to choose full equality when receiving
a fixed income of e5, independent of the distribution of preliminary income.
7As a consequence, the number of spectators (n = 182) equals the number of stakeholders
(n = 182).
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(instructions can be found in Appendix 2.5.4.4). Subjects learn about the respective
other treatment not before beliefs are elicited.
Beliefs are incentivized with e2 for deviations up to one task and e1 for
deviations up to two tasks, whereas larger deviations are not paid. Only one of
the two beliefs is randomly chosen for payment in order to prevent hedging. Since
belief-other-treat is based on the first session of the respective other treatment, it is not
elicited in the first session of each treatment.
Moreover, I elicit a third belief at the end of each session of the Cheat treatment.
Subjects guess the fraction of stakeholders who did not report truthfully (belief-frac-
cheat). It is impossible to incentivize these beliefs because I refrain from individual
cheating detection.
2.2.4 Political Preferences
At the end of the experiment, I ask participants about their political preferences (i.e.,
which party they would vote for if there were federal elections next Sunday). In my
analysis, being left-wing is defined as indicating to vote for the Social Democrats
(SPD), the Green Party (Die Grünen), the socialist party (Die Linke), or the Pirate Party
Germany (Die Piraten).8 Subjects belonging to the remaining categories are treated
as being right-wing. Following this definition, 37.36% of the spectators are classified
as left-wing and 62.64% as right-wing. The distribution of spectators’ votes closely
resembles the results of the 2017 German national election. Thus, in terms of political
preferences, the sample of the experiment is similar to the German population. In
order to validate my classification of political parties, subjects are asked to indicate
where they rate their general political attitudes on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being
8A coalition of the three established parties SPD, Die Grünen, and Die Linke is also called “left-wing
coalition”, see, e.g., http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10318949/
Germanys-coalitions-What-happens-next.html (last accessed on March 5, 2018). The Pirate Party
Germany, which was found in 2006, is typically classified as being left-wing.
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left and 10 being right. Although this question may be susceptible to the central
tendency bias (64% of subjects indicate a score of 4, 5, or 6), left-wing spectators
rate themselves lower on this scale than right-wing spectators (mean left-wing = 3.94,
mean right-wing = 5.37). The difference in ratings across political preferences is
significant (p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Table 2.2 in the Appendix
shows which parties spectators would vote for, the 2017 German federal election
results as well as the average scores of spectators’ general political attitudes.
2.2.5 Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted with 364 participants at the Munich Experimental
Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich
in May 2016 and May 2017. In total, 184 subjects were assigned to eight sessions
of the Monitor treatment and 180 subjects to eight sessions of the Cheat treatment.9
Subjects were students from various fields of study and recruited using the online
system “ORSEE" (Greiner, 2015). Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the
two treatments and participated in one session only. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software “z-Tree" (Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects found a printed version of the instruc-
tions of Part 1 at their seats, which was read aloud by the experimenter (myself) to en-
sure common knowledge about the rules of the real effort task (see Appendix 2.5.4.1).
In addition, these instructions informed participants that only later on they will be
assigned to one of the two roles. Hence, stakeholders as well as spectators worked on
the matrix task. In this way, spectators were familiar with the difficulty of the matrix
task, which was important for eliciting their beliefs about the stakeholders’ perfor-
mances. Furthermore, subjects were told that the spectator can distribute earnings of
9For each of the two treatments, half of the sessions were conducted in 2016 and the other half in
2017. The time of conducting the experiment does not affect the results (see Section 2.3.2).
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Part 1 and that the spectator will receive more detailed information on this at a later
point in time.10 Thereafter, subjects received the exercise sheet and were provided
with pens for marking their solutions. After timeout, a second set of instructions
about how to compare own with correct solutions appeared on the subjects’ screens
and were read aloud (see Appendix 2.5.4.2). Subsequently, subjects were displayed
their role, and stakeholders self-reported their performance while spectators received
detailed instructions about Part 2 (see Appendix 2.5.4.3) and made their redistribution
decisions. Thus, only stakeholders compared their own solutions with the correct ones.
After that, the exercise sheets were collected and verified in Monitor, and subjects
in both treatments indicated on a 4 point Likert scale whether they considered it to
be fair that preliminary income was proportional to self-reported performance. Next,
belief-own-treat and belief-other-treat were elicited.
Finally, the participants answered a questionnaire about their political prefer-
ences, opinion on income inequality in Germany on a scale from 1 (inequality should
be reduced) to 10 (inequality should be enlarged in order to provide incentives),
socio-demographic characteristics, and their belief about the fraction of stakeholders
who did not report truthfully (belief-frac-cheat, only in the Cheat treatment). Subjects
received their payments privately after the experiment and earned e12.22 on average,
including an average show-up fee of e4.5.11 Sessions lasted on average 50 minutes.
10Little information about Part 2 cannot exclude the possibility of strategic effort provision. However,
this would not affect spectators redistributive choices because they were elicited with the strategy
method and are thus independent of actual performances.
11The show-up fee was e4 in 2016 and e5 in 2017 due to changes of the rules of MELESSA.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Matrix Task Performance
Figure 2.1 shows that reported performances are significantly higher in Cheat than in
Monitor and indicates that manipulation by giving stakeholders the opportunity to
cheat was successful (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Average reported
performance is higher in Cheat (13.8) than in Monitor (11.5). Moreover, while only
5.4% of the stakeholders in Monitor indicate to have solved all matrices, this is the
case for 16.7% of the stakeholders in Cheat. This is line with the finding of previous
studies on dishonesty that although some people are cheating, the assumption of
people always submitting payoff-maximizing reports is empirically not valid (e.g.,
Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Jiang, 2013; Cohn et al.,
2014; Abeler et al., 2016).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of reported performances
In addition, subjects’ beliefs about average reported performance in their own
session is significantly different across treatments (p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney U-test,
two-sided). On average, belief-own-treat is 1.9 tasks higher in Cheat than in Monitor,
which is close to the actual difference of 2.3 tasks. Furthermore, subjects in Monitor
find the income generating process of preliminary income significantly more fair than
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subjects in Cheat (p = 0.037, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Both of these results
are further indications of successful treatment manipulation.
2.3.2 Inequality Acceptance and Political Preferences
The redistribution decisions of the spectators determine the final income distribution
between two stakeholders. In order to quantify the extent to which spectators are
willing to accept inequalities, I use the Gini coefficient as inequality measure:
Inequality = |Income Player A1 − Income Player A2|
Income Player A1 + Income Player A2
This measure of inequality relates the absolute difference in income to the
total income and is zero in cases of full equality and one if one of the two stake-
holders receives the entire total income. I define aggregate inequality as the average
over the Gini coefficients of the eleven possible distributions of preliminary income.
Thus, aggregate inequality contains the spectator’s decisions for perfectly unequal
preliminary incomes of (10,0), full equality in the case of (5,5) as well as all cases in
between. Using this measure yields a lower bound for the treatment effect because
one can expect hardly any redistribution in cases of low inequality (e.g., (5,5)) in
both treatments.
Figure 2.2 shows the mean aggregate inequality across the two treatments and
political preferences. If a spectator never redistributes income, aggregate inequality is
0.5, which is indicated by the horizontal dashed line. Left-wing spectators implement
significantly lower inequality in Cheat than in Monitor (p = 0.027, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). While they eliminate 26.2% of initial inequality in Monitor, they
reduce inequality by 45.6% in Cheat, implying an increase of 74% in inequality
reduction. In contrast, the treatment has no significant effect for right-wing spectators
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate inequality
(p = 0.641, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). They reduce inequality by 27.8% in
Monitor and 25.8% in Cheat.
Table 2.1 contains a series of Tobit regressions to account for using the censored
dependent variable aggregate inequality. Column (1) suggests that aggregate inequal-
ity is not affected by the treatment for the pooled sample, which is due to the fact that
the majority of spectators are right-wing. Column (2) confirms the result depicted in
Figure 2.2. Inequality is significantly reduced through cheating opportunities when
being left-wing (p = 0.004). However, the treatment does not affect implemented
inequality of right-wing spectators. The sum of the treatment dummy and the inter-
action term “Cheat × Right-wing” in column (2) indicates that the treatment effect
for right-wing spectators is insignificant (p = 0.791, F-Test).12 Furthermore, being
12Interpreting the coefficient of an interaction term can be misleading in Tobit models (Ai and
Norton, 2003). To examine this problem, I perform an alternative calculation of the interaction effect
by computing the predicted values of aggregate inequality separately for left-wing and right-wing
spectators in Monitor and Cheat. The respective difference in differences of these four groups’ predicted
values are of the same size as the marginal effect of the interaction terms in the models of column (2)
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Table 2.1: Aggregate inequality
Dependent variable Aggregate inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheat −0.036 −0.112*** −0.110*** −0.110*** −0.089** −0.118***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039)
Right-wing −0.010 −0.028 −0.032 −0.006 −0.021
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.048)
Cheat × Right-wing 0.120** 0.116** 0.115** 0.128** 0.164***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.062) (0.058)
We need inequality 0.014* 0.013* 0.010 0.012
(1 = no, 10 = yes) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant 0.358*** 0.364*** 0.316*** 0.334*** 0.306*** 0.215**
(0.010) (0.030) (0.040) (0.077) (0.075) (0.101)
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 144
Log likelihood 1.433 4.589 6.502 7.931 9.596 21.228
Notes: Two-limit Tobit regressions regressions on aggregate inequality. Columns (4) to (6) include a binary variable for whether
the experiment was conducted in 2016 or 2017 (insignificant in all specifications) and additional covariates from the question-
naire: age, gender, semester, and number of experiments so far (all insignificant in all specifications). Column (5) includes the
categories “other party” and nonvoters in the definition of being left-wing. Column (6) excludes spectators who would vote
for “other party” as well as nonvoters. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
right-wing has no impact on aggregate inequality in the Monitor treatment (p = 0.805).
In column (3), I add as regressor the answer to whether the spectators are of the
opinion that income inequality should be reduced, or enlarged in order to provide
incentives for individual performance. Believing that “we need inequality” increases
implemented income inequality, while the treatment effect remains significant for
left-wing spectators (p = 0.003). Hence, differences in the opinion on inequality13
cannot explain that the effect of cheating opportunities depends on political pref-
erences. The results are robust to adding a time dummy (whether the experiment
was conducted in 2016 or 2017) as well as personal background characteristics in
column (4). In column (5), I include nonvoters and spectators who indicate to vote
to (6) in Table 2.1. Thus, the bias induced by using interaction terms in a nonlinear model is negligible
in my estimations.
13Right-wing spectators (mean = 4.95) favor inequality significantly more than left-wing spectators
(mean = 3.49, p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).
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for “other party” in the definition of left-wing instead of right-wing. The results are
robust to this specification (with the exception that the significance of the treatment
dummy decreases to p = 0.031). Furthermore, the results are also robust to excluding
nonvoters and spectators who would vote for “other party” in column (6).14
In order to provide further evidence that left-wing spectators’ decisions are
affected by the treatment because they suspect player A1 to be cheating, I analyze
each redistribution decision separately. A spectator should doubt the performance
of a stakeholder if it is far above the other stakeholder’s performance, which results
in high income inequality.15 In contrast, there is little reason to attribute cheating to
a stakeholder when income is evenly distributed and thus reported performances of
both stakeholders are similar.16
Figure 2.3 shows the treatment effect depending on preliminary income dis-
tribution for left-wing (left panel) and right-wing spectators (right panel). The very
left and the very right bar represent the treatment effect when the income distri-
bution before redistribution is (10,0) and (5,5) respectively.17 The treatment has
a significant negative effect on the implemented inequality of left-wing spectators
for high pre-redistribution inequality. Two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests indicate a
14In addition to investigating the Gini coefficient, I use the amount of money redistributed by
spectators to study treatment differences. This is important because spectators might redistribute
away from player A1 — who receives the higher preliminary income of the two stakeholders except
for the case of full equality — in such a way that after redistribution player A2 has more income
than player A1. For instance, a spectator in Cheat might determine the final income distribution to
be (2,8) when preliminary incomes were (8,2), which results in the same inequality before and after
redistribution. However, it is important to capture this incidence of redistribution as it might reflect
punishing player A1 for potential cheating. Results on redistribution are reported in Appendix 2.5.1
and support the results of analyzing the Gini coefficient.
15This holds true even more when only one of the two stakeholders can cheat. To analyze the impact
of asymmetric cheating opportunities within a pair of stakeholders, I ran an additional treatment where
only one of the two stakeholders could misreport the own performance. The results of this treatment
are reported in Appendix 2.5.2.
16In this case, both stakeholders could be cheating. However, there is no possibility to redistribute
away from a suspicious potential cheater to another presumably more honest stakeholder because it is
not possible to detect cheating.
17Levels of inequality for both treatments are shown in Figure 2.6 in the Appendix.
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Notes: The figure shows the treatment effect on implemented inequality by subtracting
inequality in the Monitor treatment from inequality in the Cheat treatment. The effect is
shown separately for each preliminary level of income of player A1. The left panel displays
the effect for left-wing spectators and the right panel for right-wing spectators. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 2.3: Treatment effect on inequality
reduction in inequality if player A1 has a preliminary income of at least 7.5 (p-values
do not exceed 0.033), while there is no significant treatment effect otherwise (with
the exception of player A1 having e6.5 before redistribution, p = 0.072). These results
suggest that left-wing spectators suspect player A1 to cheat when initial inequality is
high and therefore reduce inequality in these cases. There is no significant effect of
cheating opportunities for any of the preliminary income distributions when being
right-wing.
Despite analyzing implemented inequality, the question remains which kind of
redistribution decisions drive the treatment effect for left-wing spectators. Therefore,
Figure 2.4 depicts player A1’s income after redistribution contingent on his income
before redistribution. Circles on the downward-sloping line indicate cases of no
redistribution, circles on the horizontal line cases of redistribution resulting in full
equality, and circles between the two lines are associated with redistribution away
from player A1 such that the ranking of incomes is maintained. The few circles
above the downward-sloping line represent “negative redistribution”, which leaves
the pair of stakeholders with higher inequality after redistribution at the expense
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Notes: The figure shows the spectators’ redistribution decisions depending on treatment
(upper panels show Monitor and lower panels Cheat) and political preferences (left panels
show left-wing and right panels right-wing spectators). Numbers in circles in case of no
redistribution when the preliminary income of player A1 is e5 indicate the number of
observations and serve as a benchmark for the remaining circles.
Figure 2.4: Overview redistribution decisions
of player A2. Circles below the horizontal line indicate “overredistribution”, where
player A1 receives a lower income than player A2.
Supporting the previous findings, systematic treatment differences can be
inferred from Figure 2.4 only for left-wing spectators. Two-sided Fisher’s exact tests
reveal that the fraction of full equality is significantly higher in Cheat (lower left panel)
than in Monitor (upper left panel) if player A1 has a preliminary income between 10
and 7.5, or 6.5 (five comparisons are significant at the 5% and two at the 10% level).
This is in line with the result depicted in Figure 2.3 that left-wing spectators only react
to cheating opportunities by implementing a lower inequality when the preliminary
income distribution is unequal. In addition, there is a higher fraction of left-wing
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spectators in Cheat than in Monitor that always implement full equality independent of
preliminary incomes (21.2% vs. 5.7%; p = 0.079, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). These
two results suggest that the treatment difference for left-wing spectators is driven
by an increase in redistribution decisions that result in full equality when cheating
opportunities are present.
The analysis of this section shows that left-wing spectators are less willing to
accept inequalities when cheating is possible. Looking at their decisions contingent
on the income distribution before spectators can redistribute suggests that this is the
case because they suspect the stakeholder with higher initial income of cheating. As
a consequence, left-wing spectators implement more often a perfectly equal income
distribution between the two stakeholders. The interaction between cheating oppor-
tunities and being left-wing cannot be explained by differences in their opinion on
income inequality. In the next section, I therefore investigate whether different beliefs
or norms about cheating across left-wing and right-wing spectators can account for
this finding.
2.3.3 Beliefs and Norms about Cheating
Apart from preferences, there are two alternative explanations for why treatment
differences depend on political color. (i) Beliefs about cheating might interact with
being left-wing. If in the Cheat treatment left-wing spectators believe to a larger
extent that stakeholders are cheating than right-wing spectators, this might account
for the treatment effect. (ii) Norms about cheating might differ between left-wing and
right-wing spectators. If right-wing spectators find it more acceptable to cheat when
there is an opportunity to do so than left-wing spectators, this could also explain the
results.
2.3 Results 26
Beliefs about cheating can be inferred from the three different measures of
beliefs in the Cheat treatment. First, subjects were asked to guess the average
reported performance in their own session (belief-own-treat) and the average reported
performance in the Monitor treatment (belief-other-treat). Subtracting the latter from
the former one indicates the spectator’s belief to which extent stakeholders cheated on
average. This difference is not significantly different between left-wing (mean = 2.65)
and right-wing (mean = 2.02) spectators (p = 0.389, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).
Second, I also compare belief-own-treat between the two groups because spectators’
answers to the belief about the Monitor treatment (belief-other-treat) could suffer from
self-serving ex-post rationalization of their redistribution decisions. Belief-own-treat is
not significantly different between left-wing (mean = 10.88) and right-wing spectators
(mean = 11.21; p = 0.666, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Third, subjects in
Cheat were asked to guess the fraction of dishonest stakeholders (belief-frac-cheat).
Again, beliefs do not differ between left-wing (58%) and right-wing spectators (57%;
p = 0.807, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Thus, although right-wing spectators
believe to the same extent as left-wing spectators that stakeholders are cheating, they
are not willing to redistribute more in Cheat than in Monitor.
It has been shown that norms (behavior that people perceive as appropriate)
have predictive power for subjects’ actual behavior (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013).
In addition, several studies in the economics literature use actual behavior to identify
norms (e.g., Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Therefore, I use
actual cheating behavior of the stakeholders as a proxy for the spectators’ norms about
cheating. Performances in the Monitor treatment show that left-wing and right-wing
stakeholders are equally able to work on the matrix task (p = 0.977, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). While their average performance in Monitor is 11.53 and 11.5
tasks respectively, in Cheat, left-wing stakeholders report to have solved 14.35 tasks
and right-wing stakeholders 13.08 tasks. This difference between the two groups is
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not significant (p = 0.283, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). If anything, left-wing
stakeholders tend to cheat more than right-wing stakeholders. However, there is no
significant evidence that the norm about cheating depends on political preferences.
In particular, looking at actual behavior suggests that right-wing stakeholders do not
find it more acceptable to cheat than left-wing stakeholders and I assume that the
same holds true for right-wing and left-wing spectators.18
Finding no differences in beliefs and norms about cheating between left-wing
and right-wing spectators suggests that the difference in their choices reflects a
difference in preferences. Right-wing spectators are reluctant to take away money from
a stakeholder due to potential cheating if they do not know whether this stakeholder
actually cheated. In contrast, left-wing spectators are willing to redistribute more if
they believe that someone has cheated — even without being able to detect cheating.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
The sources of inequality largely influence what people consider to be a fair dis-
tribution of income and wealth within a society. Assuming that fiscal imbalances
will rise in most western countries due to demographic trends, these redistributive
preferences will be particularly relevant for designing welfare policies in the future
and thus constitute an important issue in public economics (Kuziemko et al., 2015).
In this chapter, I focus on cheating as a potential source of unequal outcomes. I
find large differences in how to deal with these inequalities depending on political
preferences. Supporters of left-wing parties substantially redistribute incomes when
cheating is possible, while supporters of right-wing parties refrain from redistribution.
As a consequence, cheating opportunities — which receive increasing public attention
18Since roles were randomly assigned in the experiment, norms of stakeholders and spectators
should not systematically differ from each other.
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through recent revelations about fraudulent behavior — amplify the disagreement
over redistributive policies between the political left and right.
A deeper look into my data reveals that left-wing spectators’ redistribution deci-
sions are only affected by potential misreporting in cases of large income differences.
This provides strong evidence that left-wing spectators suspect a “rich” stakeholder
to be cheating. Furthermore, my results suggest that both beliefs and norms about
cheating do not depend on political color. Hence, right-wingers refrain from redistri-
bution although they believe that stakeholders are cheating and although they are
themselves reluctant to cheat to the full extent. This shows that right-wing spectators
hesitate to redistribute if they do not know for sure that high relative income was
acquired by dishonest means, while left-wingers are less concerned about this.
These findings might help to understand the political debate about how to
tackle tax evasion and can inform politicians about the consequences of preventing
fraudulent behavior. An example for fighting tax evasion are a couple of German
federal states which bought tax CDs that contain information about German tax
dodgers’ Swiss bank accounts. While the Social Democrats advocate the potentially
illegal purchases from whistleblowers, the Conservatives object such measures.19 One
reason for these different strategies might be that tax CDs purchases raises attention to
potential cheating, which is, according to my findings, beneficial for left-wing parties
with regard to justifying redistributive policies.
Further implications might be drawn concerning the different extent of re-
distributive policies between Europe and the United States. Europeans prefer sub-
stantially more redistribution than U.S. Americans (Almås et al., 2016), which can
be partly explained by differences in beliefs about whether luck or effort determine
19See, e.g., http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-authorities-
investigate-ubs-in-relation-to-tax-evasion-a-849366.html, last accessed on March 5,
2018.
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inequalities (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). As U.S. Americans seem to be far less
skeptical towards the very rich, perceived cheating opportunities might also contribute
to explain cross-country evidence on redistributive policies. Therefore, exploring how
redistributive preferences are affected by potential cheating in the United States as
opposed to Europe is a fruitful avenue for further research.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Supplementary Results
Table 2.2: Voting behavior and political left-right score of spectators &
2017 German federal election results
Political Party Experiment (in %) 2017 federal election (in %) left-right scale
CDU/CSU 28.57 25.02 5.73
SPD 14.84 15.58 4.04
Die Grünen 14.29 7.02 4.08
Die Linke 6.04 6.79 3.45
AFD 3.30 8.17 7.67
FDP 9.89 9.60 5.56
Die Piraten 2.20 0.28 3.75
Other party 6.04 3.51 4.73
Would not go to the election 14.84 24.03 4.30
Notes: The parties are the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party (Die Grünen), the
socialist party (Die Linke), the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AFD), the libertarian party (FDP), and the Pirate
Party Germany (Die Piraten). Results of the 2017 German federal election are based on the “second vote” and calculated with-
out rejected votes. The scale for political attitudes ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate redistribution
Figure 2.5 is equivalent to Figure 2.2 for redistribution instead of inequality. As
for inequality, aggregate redistribution is defined as the average over all eleven
decisions of the spectator.20 Left-wing spectators react to the treatment even stronger
when looking at redistribution instead of inequality. They redistribute twice as much
in the Cheat treatment than in the Monitor treatment, which is highly significant
(p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). There is no significant effect of cheating
opportunities for right-wing spectators (p = 0.433, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).
Regression results for aggregate redistribution can be found in Table 2.3 and are in
line with the findings on inequality in Table 2.1.
20Decisions in which the spectator redistributes away from player A2 are also taken into account.
Consequently, I use the absolute values of money redistributed to calculate the aggregate redistribution
of one spectator.
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Table 2.3: Aggregate redistribution
Dependent variable Aggregate redistribution in e
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheat 0.215 0.745*** 0.737*** 0.758*** 0.478* 0.795***
(0.142) (0.246) (0.240) (0.252) (0.265) (0.260)
Right-wing 0.148 0.233 0.247 0.010 0.210
(0.236) (0.237) (0.231) (0.320) (0.300)
Cheat × Right-wing −0.840*** −0.818*** −0.820*** −0.593 −0.930***
(0.307) (0.284) (0.280) (0.374) (0.341)
We need inequality −0.065** −0.064** −0.052 −0.077*
(1 = no, 10 = yes) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.045)
Constant 0.844*** 0.752*** 0.983*** 0.800* 0.959** 1.268**
(0.078) (0.165) (0.176) (0.478) (0.457) (0.520)
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 144
Log likelihood -274.643 -270.166 -268.661 -264.546 -265.249 -202.152
Notes: Two-limit Tobit regressions regressions on aggregate redistribution (lower limit: –82.5, upper limit: 82.5). Columns (4)
to (6) include a binary variable for whether the experiment was conducted in 2016 or 2017 (insignificant in all specifications)
and additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, gender, semester, and number of experiments so far. Column (5) in-
cludes the categories “other party” and nonvoters in the definition of being left-wing. Column (6) excludes spectators who
would vote for “other party” as well as nonvoters. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Notes: The figure shows inequality separately for each level of preliminary income of
player A1. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 2.6: Inequality by preliminary income
Figure 2.6 shows inequality depending on preliminary income distribution and treat-
ment for left-wing (left panel) and right-wing spectators (right panel). The two very
left and very right bars represent inequality when the income distribution before
redistribution is (10,0) and (5,5) respectively. Inequality is not significantly different
between left-wing and right-wing spectators in any of the redistribution decisions in
the Monitor treatment (Mann-Whitney U-tests, two-sided).
2.5.2 The Mixed Treatment
I conducted an additional treatment to find out how unequal cheating opportunities
affect inequality acceptance. This is motivated by “real-world” examples where only
some people are able to cheat, while it is much harder or even impossible for others to
report untruthfully. Consider, for instance, the cases of tax evasion, doping in sports,
and faking educational achievements. Only individuals who are subject to tax can
evade taxes, and only the “rich” might have the means to do this large-scale. Only
professional athletes have access to well known doping doctors. And only people
belonging to the higher education system have the opportunity to plagiarize a PhD
thesis. Therefore, I implement a treatment called Mixed, where only one of the two
stakeholders is able to cheat. While in the Cheat treatment it was unclear whether
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both or only one of the two stakeholders cheated, even in cases with high preliminary
inequality, it is clearer that the stakeholder with a much higher income is presumably
cheating in the Mixed treatment. Furthermore, spectators might perceive it as unfair
that only one of the two stakeholders has the opportunity to cheat. For these reasons,
inequality should be even more reduced in Mixed than in Cheat.
Procedural Details. Eight sessions of the Mixed treatment were conducted in
May and June 2017 with a total of 172 subjects. Subjects earned e12.94 on average,
including a e5 show-up fee. The exercise sheet was collected only from one of the
two stakeholders. After working on the matrix task, it was publicly announced that
subjects will next be informed about their role and whether their exercise sheet will
be collected (see Appendix 2.5.4.2). Hence, all participants, including the spectators,
knew that the stakeholders were aware of their cheating opportunities before stating
their performance and that only one of the two stakeholders could cheat.
Results. In the Mixed treatment, reported performance of subjects that were
monitored (mean of 11 tasks) do not significantly differ from those that were able
to cheat (12.63; p = 0.158, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Since reported per-
formance of the monitored stakeholders in Mixed is generated under the exactly
same conditions as of stakeholders in Monitor, these observations can be pooled and
compared with potential cheaters in Mixed. Again, performances do not significantly
differ (p = 0.176, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).21 In line with stakeholders’ actual
performances, beliefs of spectators about reported performance in their own session
(belief-own-treat) do not significantly differ between Monitor (9.35 on average) and
Mixed (9.31; p = 0.832, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). In addition, asking specta-
21Based on these observations (135 subjects that cannot cheat with a mean of 11.35 tasks solved
as baseline and 43 potential cheaters), I calculate the minimal detectable difference of a two-sided
Mann-Whitney U-test for the 5% significance level. A treatment difference of at least 2.25 tasks
is detected with a statistical power of 80%. Thus, the sample is large enough to detect treatment
differences in performance of a similar size as implied by the difference between Monitor and Cheat
(2.29 tasks).
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tors in Mixed about the average performance of stakeholders in the Cheat treatment
(belief-other-treat in the Mixed treatment) reveals that spectators in Mixed believe re-
ported performance to be higher in Cheat (12.87) than in Mixed (p < 0.0001, Wilcoxon
signed rank test, two-sided). Moreover, spectators’ beliefs about the ratio of cheaters
to those stakeholders who are able to cheat (belief-frac-cheat) are higher in Cheat
(57%) than in Mixed (50%; p = 0.036, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).22 Hence,
spectators seem to anticipate stakeholders (missing) dishonest behavior as there is no
clear evidence that spectators in Mixed believe stakeholders be cheating.
As a consequence of failed treatment manipulation in the Mixed treatment,
implemented aggregate inequality does neither differ for right-wing (p = 0.467)
nor left-wing spectators (p = 0.670) between Monitor and Mixed (Mann-Whitney
U-tests, two-sided). In summary, the null hypothesis of equal performance between
stakeholders that are monitored and those who are not cannot be rejected. The low or
nonexistent occurrence of cheating might be a result of stakeholders finding it unfair
that only one of them can cheat. When designing this treatment, it was difficult to
predict this finding since this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first treatment where
only one of two subjects who are otherwise in exactly the same position can cheat.23
In line with this, spectators in Mixed seem to anticipate stakeholders’ behavior as I
find no evidence that they believe stakeholders to be cheating. Given this, it is not
surprising that I do not find a treatment effect in Mixed.
22Belief-frac-cheat is not incentivized and likely to be overstated due to demand effects by explicitly
asking for the fraction of cheaters. Therefore, I refrain from interpreting the size of this belief but only
compare the difference across treatments.
23This conclusion is drawn from comparing the Mixed treatment to treatments of 72 papers analyzed
in a meta-study by Abeler et al. (2016).
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2.5.3 Screenshots of Decision Screens
Figure 2.7: Screenshot of one of the stakeholder’s decision screens
Figure 2.8: Screenshot of the spectator’s decision screen
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2.5.4 Instructions
2.5.4.1 General Instructions at the Beginning of the Experiment
[In paper form]24
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment serves to investigate economic decision making behavior. You can
earn money, which will be paid to you individually and in cash after the experiment
has ended.
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment,
please raise your hand or press the red button on your keyboard. We will then come
to you and answer your question in private.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions. Your own
decisions as well as the decisions of other participants can determine your payoffs.
These payoffs are determined according to the rules which are explained in the
following.
Payment
At the end of the experiment, you will receive in cash the money that you have earned
during the experiment and additional 5 euro for showing up in time. Therefore, we
will call every participant based on his seat number, i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know your payment, and also you will not get to know the payments of other
participants.
24The instructions were translated from German. The original version is available upon request.
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Anonymity
Data from this experiment will be analyzed anonymously, i.e., we will never link your
name to the data of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a
receipt confirming that you received your payment. This receipt serves accounting
purposes only.
Assignment of Roles
There are two different roles in this experiment: A and B. The role of each participant
is determined randomly. Whether you are participant A or B will be communicated to
you at a later point in time on your screen.
Your Task
At the beginning of the experiment, we will hand out an exercise sheet, which we will
place upside down on your desk. Please turn the sheet over only when you are asked
to do so. There are 20 tasks on the exercise, which are numbered top down. It does
not matter on which task you work first.
Each task consists of a box containing 12 numbers. Here is an example:
1,69 1,82 2,91 
4,67 3,81 3,05 
5,82 5,06 4,28 
6,36 6,19 4,57 
Example
Only two numbers in the box add up to 10.00. It is your task to find these two numbers
and to circle them. In the following, you see the correct solution for the example.
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1,69 1,82 2,91 
4,67 3,81 3,05 
5,82 5,06 4,28 
6,36 6,19 4,57 
Correct solution of the example
You have 6 minutes to work on the tasks. For your guidance, a clock will display the
remaining time on your screen. After the 6 minutes expired, please put down your
pen. Subsequently, we will collect your pens.
Income of Participant A
After timeout, participant A compares the numbers which he marked to the solution.
You will receive more information on this after working on the task. Participant A
receives 1 point for every correct solution.
Two participants A are randomly assigned to each other in order to determine their
incomes. 10 euro will be split up among these two participants. Income is proportional
to the number of points achieved in the preceding task and rounded to 50 cents.
Example 1: One participant A achieved 6 points and the other participant A 4 points.
Thus, both participants A have achieved 10 points in total. The participant A with 6
points therefore receives an income of 6.00 euro ((6 points / 10 points) x 10 euro =
6 euro). The participant A with 4 points receives an income of 4 Euro ((4 points / 10
points) x 10 euro = 4.00 euro).
Example 2: One participant A achieved 12 points and the other participant A 7 points.
Thus, both participants A have achieved 19 points in total. The participant A with 12
points therefore receives an income of 6.50 euro ((12 points / 19 points) x 10 euro
= 6.32, rounded to 50 cents). The participant A with 7 points receives an income of
3.50 euro ((7 points / 19 points) x 10 euro = 3.68 euro, rounded to 50 cents).
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Income of Participant B
Participant B can distribute the incomes which participants A earned. Participants B
will receive detailed information about this on their screen later on.
Further Procedures
We will soon hand out an exercise sheet to each of you. Please leave this sheet upside
down until we announce the beginning of the task. After you have finished the task,
the computer determines whether you are participant A or B. You will be informed
about this on your screen. The assignment of roles is random. During the experiment,
you will receive further information on your screen.
2.5.4.2 Treatment Variation after the Matrix Task
[On the screens of the participants]
Entering of Solutions
All participants have now worked on the task.
Participants A will soon have 3 minutes to compare the numbers which he marked to
the solution as follows:
On the left hand side of the screen, participant A sees the correct solution of the
tasks. On the right hand side of the screen, participant A should indicate whether
the correct solution corresponds to the numbers that he marked on his exercise sheet.
After timeout, participants A automatically proceed to the next screen and can no
longer compare solutions.
On the next screen, you will see an example of the screen on which participant A
compares his solutions with the correct solutions. This screen will be displayed to you
for 15 seconds. You do neither have to indicate something nor click on OK. The tasks
on the following screen are examples. Please click now on OK.
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[new screen]
[Monitor treatment only]
Important: After all participants A have compared their solutions to the correct
solutions, we collect the exercise sheets of all participants. We then verify that
participant A did not make any mistake when comparing his solutions to the correct
ones. If participant A made a mistake, we will correct the number of points of
participant A. You will soon be informed whether you are participant A or B. Please
click now on OK.
[Cheat treatment only]
Important: You will receive your payment in the room next door. There is also a
shredder in this room. At the end of the experiment, you will shred your exercise
sheet and afterwards receive your payment. This ensures that we cannot trace back
your solutions. You will soon be informed whether you are participant A or B. Please
click now on OK.
[Mixed treatment only, see Appendix 2.5.2]
Important: After all participants A have compared their solutions to the correct
solutions, we collect the exercise sheets of one of the two matched participants A.
We then verify that this participant A did not make any mistake when comparing his
solutions to the correct ones. If this participant A made a mistake, we will correct
the number of points of this participant A. We do not collect the exercise sheet of
the other participant A. You will receive your payment in the room next door. There
is also a shredder in this room. If we do not collect your exercise sheet, please put
it in the envelope which you find on your desk. All participants have to seal their
envelopes and shred it before receiving their payoff. This ensures that we cannot trace
back the solutions of the participants whose exercise sheets we do not collect. You
2.5 Appendix 42
will soon be informed whether you are participant A or B, and whether we will collect
your exercise sheet. Please click now on OK.
2.5.4.3 Instructions for Participant B
[On screens of participants B while participants A compare their solutions to correct
solutions; not read aloud by experimenter]
Your Decisions
As participant B you will be randomly assigned to 2 participants A among whom
10 euro will be split up as described in the instructions. We call this income, which
they receive for working on the task, preliminary income of participants A. You will
now determine the final income of participants A for every possible distribution of the
preliminary incomes.
You see the table where you will enter the final incomes further below. [table without
possibility to enter something is shown at the bottom of the screen] Final incomes of
participants A, which you determine, must add up to 10 euro. You may enter final
incomes in 10 cents steps. In order to assign final incomes unambiguously, we call the
two participants A “participant A1” and “participant A2”.
After the two participants A compared their solutions to the correct solutions, prelimi-
nary incomes will be determined. This income then corresponds to one row in the
table: e.g., 7 euro for participant A1 and 3 euro for participant A2. Participants A will
receive the final incomes that you enter in the same row on the right side of the table
(e.g., next to 7 euro for participant A1 and 3 euro for participant A2). Hence, each of
your decisions can be decisive for the payoffs of the participants A!
[new screen]
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Implementation of Your Decision
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly determine whether your
decision or the decision of another participant B will be implemented. The probability
for your decision to be implemented is 50%.
Your Income
As participant B you receive a fixed income of 10 euro independent of your decision.
You will make your decisions on the next screen.
2.5.4.4 Incentivized Belief Elicitation
[On screens of participants; not read aloud by experimenter; text in Monitor]
Assessment
You will provide two assessments in the following. You will receive details hereto on
the next two screens. You are paid for the accuracy of your assessments.
However, only one of the two assessments is paid. At the end of the experiment,
the computer will randomly determine which of the two assessments is paid. The
probability that assessment 1 or assessment 2 is paid is 50% respectively.
[new screen]
Assessment 1
All participants A now have compared their solutions to the correct ones. Please assess
how many points participants A achieved on average in the task at the beginning of
the experiment.
You are paid for the accuracy of your assessment. If your assessment deviates less than
1 point from the actual average, you will receive 2 euro additional to your remaining
income from the experiment. If your assessment deviates at least 1 point but less than
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2 points from the actual average, you will receive 1 euro. Larger deviations are not
paid.
How many points did the participants A achieve on average? (integers only)
[new screen]
Assessment 2
We now ask you to provide an assessment for a similar experiment. In the other
experiment, participants worked on exactly the same task on which you have worked
in the current experiment.
Important
In contrast to the current experiment, exercise sheets were not collected and it was not
verified that the solutions had been compared without making a mistake. Participants
were aware of this before comparing the solutions.
Please assess how many points participants A achieved on average in the other
experiment.
As before, you are paid for the accuracy of your assessment. If your assessment
deviates less than 1 point from the actual average, you will receive 2 euro additional
to your remaining income from the experiment. If your assessment deviates at least 1
point but less than 2 points from the actual average, you will receive 1 euro. Larger
deviations are not paid.
How many points did the participants A achieve on average in the other experiment?
(integers only)
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3Choice as Justification forDishonesty
Joint with Florian Loipersberger
3.1 Introduction
The expanding literature on dishonesty indicates that some people want to benefit
from the gains of lying but simultaneously prefer to appear honest in front of others
and towards themselves (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;
Abeler et al., 2016). Thus, these people care about the norm of truth-telling and
therefore do not bluntly lie to the full extent. As a consequence, they create excuses
for dishonest behavior to cope with the conflict between profits from lying and moral
considerations.
In this chapter, we examine whether people justify dishonest behavior towards
another person with the idea that this other person self-selected into a situation where
being lied to is possible. Consider, for example, the case of an employer who promises
his employees that their workload will not be increased in the future, even though
this is exactly what he plans to implement. To justify this lie, he tells himself that his
employees were free to choose to work for a different company. As another example,
consider a bank employee who recommends an unfit financial product to a customer
in order to receive a high commission. In light of her guilty conscience, she brings
to her mind that every customer chooses her bank and financial products herself. In
these examples, individuals apply the following principle to justify immoral behavior.
People should be held personally responsible for their outcomes in life, in particular if
they could have chosen differently (Dworkin, 1981a,b).
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We address this issue by conducting a laboratory experiment. Two participants
are randomly matched with each other. One of them (the “potential liar”) is able to
lie to the other (the “other participant”). In our design, the potential liar benefits in
monetary terms from behaving dishonestly by reducing the other participant’s payoff.1
However, the other participant does not necessarily engage in an interaction with
the potential liar but might receive an alternative payment instead. In the Random
treatment, chance determines whether both participants interact with each other. Yet
in the Choice treatment, the other participant can choose to interact with the potential
liar or to take the alternative payment.
Our experimental setup enables us to cleanly identify the effect of making a
choice on the probability of being lied to. This is difficult to achieve in field settings
as most choices in the field involve reasonable alternatives. For instance, consider
an employee who can choose between two comparable employers. Deciding for one
of the two employers signals trust that the chosen employer will keep his promises.
In this situation, trust and choice coincide. Therefore, their effects on lying behavior
cannot be disentangled. In order to exclude trust as a confounding factor, we follow
Cappelen et al. (2016) and implement a meaningless choice. In particular, we set the
alternative payment merely e0.05 higher than the minimum that can be obtained in
the interaction. By not offering an acceptable alternative, we de facto force the other
participant into the interaction. Hence, both treatments differ in one aspect only. In
contrast to the Random treatment, the other participant made a “forced choice”, i.e., a
choice without acceptable alternatives, in the Choice treatment.
Our results suggest that there is no overall effect of the possibility to self-select
into a situation on lying behavior. Lying is only slightly more prevalent in Choice
compared to Random. Supporting a large body of the literature (e.g., Dreber and
1Thus, we study selfish black lies. Several other types of lying are studied in the literature such as
lies that benefit other people. For an overview of different types of lying, see Erat and Gneezy (2012).
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Johannesson, 2008; Conrads et al., 2013; Rosenbaum et al., 2014; Abeler et al., 2016;
Grosch and Rau, 2017), we find that men are much more likely to lie than females.
Interestingly, the treatment has a strong and significant effect on males. They are 56%
more likely to lie to the other participant in the Choice treatment compared to in the
Random treatment. In contrast, we find no significant treatment effect for females.
This suggests that forced choices can induce males to justify dishonest behavior.
Females, however, do not seem to consider forced choices as a legitimate excuse for
lying. In addition, we find that economics and business students lie significantly more
than students from other fields of study. Moreover, participants who generally trust
other people lie substantially less and thus can be interpreted to be more trustworthy
themselves.
Our study offers several contributions to the literature. First, various studies
have employed choice as treatment manipulation, for instance, through exogenous
and endogenous group formation in team production (Herbst et al., 2015), exogenous
or voting based rules in public good games (Sutter et al., 2010), or to find out whether
intentions matter in interactions where people are able to reciprocate (Falk et al.,
2008).2 However, we are aware of only one other study that uses choices without
acceptable alternatives as treatment variation in order to study the mere effect of
choice. Cappelen et al. (2016) study how a forced choice, similar to the choice we
implement, and a “nominal choice”, a choice between two ex ante identical lotteries,
affect the willingness to accept inequalities. The authors find that both of these
choices increases inequality acceptance. In this sense, their finding is in line with
our result (for male potential liars) since in both studies a forced choice serves as
justification for certain behavior. In particular, it seems as if people are held to a
2There is also a large strand of literature dealing with the determinants of individual choices, for
instance, in the domains of financial decision making, education, or health. However, we do not study
which economic variables affect choices but the consequences of the possibility to make a choice on
lying behavior.
3.1 Introduction 48
certain extent responsible for their own forced choices and it is thus morally acceptable
to disadvantage them.
Second, we contribute to the growing experimental literature on dishonesty
(e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Cappelen et al., 2013b; Cohn et al., 2015). Our design
is related to studies that build on the die roll paradigm introduced in the literature
by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013): Subjects report the outcome of a random
variable and are paid according to their report. Since the outcome is observed in
private, subjects may lie about the observed outcome to increase their payoff. These
studies detect lying at the group level by comparing the empirical distribution of
reported outcomes to the underlying theoretical distribution. In contrast to that,
we employ individual lying detection. Hence, our participants do not observe the
outcome in private but are observed by the experimenter.3 This may affect the overall
extent of lying in our experiment. Therefore, we focus on comparing the two different
treatments rather than interpreting the absolute levels of dishonesty.
Finally, our results contribute to the strand of literature that examines gender
differences in economic behavior. There are, for instance, pronounced differences
between males and females with regard to risk preferences or preferences for com-
petition. Males seem to be less risk averse than females (e.g., Eckel and Grossman,
2008; Charness and Gneezy, 2012) and more competitive (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). More specifically, our findings contribute to the
evidence about gender differences in dishonesty. We stress that we did not have a
hypothesis on gender effects since the literature provides no consistent evidence on
the relationship between gender and lying. As mentioned above, there are many
studies that find that males are significantly more likely to lie than females. However,
there are other papers that find no significant gender difference (e.g., Childs, 2012;
3See Kocher et al. (2017) and Gneezy et al. (2018) for two recent studies that also implement
individual lying detection.
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Gylfason et al., 2013; Abeler et al., 2014). This mixed evidence is reflected by our
results. While we find an overall substantial and significant gender effect, this is solely
driven by differences in the Choice treatment. We do not observe any differences
between males and females in the Random treatment. Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017)
also provide evidence that gender differences in lying are not stable across different
experimental designs. While the authors show that males lie more often in a version
of the Fischbacher-Föllmi-Heusi paradigm, they find no gender differences in a version
of the mind game, where participants imagine to throw a die and have to report the
respective number (Jiang, 2013). It can therefore be concluded that the gender effect
in lying decisions depends on the specific context.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we
describe the experimental design as well as the procedural details and a power
calculation. We present our results in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we conclude.
3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Experimental Design
Basic Setup and Interaction. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject is
randomly assigned one of two different roles, role A or role B. Every participant is
informed about his own role on the screen. Thereafter, each player A is randomly
matched with one of the players B. Player B either engages in an interaction with
player A (left half of the game tree, see Figure 3.1) or receives an outside option (right
half of Figure 3.1).
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The interaction gives player A the opportunity to lie at the expense of player B.4
In order to implement this feature, player A takes part in a lottery. The computer
randomly displays either of two colors, green (the “high state”) or orange (the “low
state”), on player A’s screen.5 Chances are q = 0.1 for the high state and 1− q = 0.9
for the low state to occur. We then ask player A to report the color that he has seen
to player B, who does not know the displayed color.6 The payoff of both players
depends on the reported color. If player A reports the high state, player A receives
e5 and player B e1. Payoffs reverse if player A reports the low state. In this way, we
obtain a zero-sum game. Thus, lying is neither efficiency enhancing nor decreasing,
which excludes efficiency concerns as a motive for lying behavior. Furthermore, when
the displayed color is orange, there is an incentive for player A to lie to player B, as
player A then receives the high payoff.
When there is no interaction, player A takes part in the same lottery. The
difference here is that the color which player A reports does not affect player B’s
payoff. Instead, player B receives an outside option of e1.05 and does not observe
the reported color in this case.
In order to study the mere effect of choice, we implement two treatments. In
our control setting, which we denote by Random, the computer randomly determines
whether player B faces the interaction or the outside option. In contrast, player B
actively takes this decision in our treatment group, which we therefore denote by
Choice. The outside option of e1.05 is only marginally higher than the lowest payoff
that can be obtained in the interaction (e1). As a consequence, we implement a
choice without acceptable alternatives and isolate the effect of having a choice from
4Player A is also able to lie in favor of player B (and at the expense of himself). However, there
is no monetary incentive to do so. Moreover, none of our participants did engage in such downward
lying. We also discuss this issue in Section 3.3.
5Figure 3.4 depicts how the color is displayed on the screen.
6See Figure 3.5 for player A’s decision screen.
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Nature / Player B
[Random] [Choice]
Nature
Player A
5, 1
green
1, 5
orange
green
(q = 0.1)
Player A
5, 1
green
1, 5
orange
orange
(1− q = 0.9)
p = 0.95 / opt in
[Random] [Choice]
Nature
Player A
5, 1.05
green
1, 1.05
orange
green
(q = 0.1)
Player A
5, 1.05
green
1, 1.05
orange
orange
(1− q = 0.9)
(1− p) = 0.05 / opt out
[Random] [Choice]
Figure 3.1: Game tree
other confounding factors (similar to Cappelen et al., 2016). For instance, if we gave
player B a “real” outside option, say e2, opting in would signal that player B trusts
player A to report the true color. In this case, player A might feel compelled to tell
the truth because player B signals trust. This motive would be indistinguishable from
acting upon player B’s choice. In addition, player B’s expected value of opting in is
e4.60 in case of truth-telling and thus amounts to a mark-up of e3.60 above the
lowest possible payoff, while the mark-up is e0.05 in case of taking the outside option.
Hence, there is a 72 times higher mark-up under the assumption of truth-telling
for opting in, which leaves the outside option to be a barely acceptable alternative.
Therefore, we de facto force player B to decide in favor of the interaction.
Predictions. A model with purely self-interested agents yields a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium for the Choice treatment in which player B opts out of
the interaction because he knows that player A always reports green. Furthermore,
standard economic theory predicts that player A always reports green in the Random
treatment. Deviations from these predictions can be obtained by assuming a certain
extent of lying aversion for player A. As a consequence, player A must report the true
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color with a probability of at least roughly 1.4% such that player B opts in, assuming
that player B is a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer and player A does not engage
in downward lying. Therefore, we hypothesize that a positive number of players B
selects into the interaction with player A. This is necessary to examine the effect of
self-selection into the interaction on the probability of being lied to.
Probabilities in the Random Treatment. In the Random treatment, we need
to define the probability for engaging in the interaction. To obtain similarity to the
Choice treatment, this probability should be close to the fraction of players B choosing
the interaction in Choice. In this way, player A faces the same probability of interacting
with player B across treatments. As it can be expected that a low fraction of players B
decides in favor of the outside option in the Choice treatment, we set the probability
of receiving the outside option in the Random treatment to the low but non-zero value
of 1− p = 0.05.7
Matching. Our design implies that only player A has the possibility to lie. As
the focus of our analysis is this lying decision, we need to generate a high number of
role A observations. Therefore, we assign role A more often than role B. Next, we form
groups by matching several players A to one player B. At the end of the experiment,
the computer randomly selects one player A in every group. This individual’s decision
is implemented and therefore also determines the payoff of player B in that group.
The remaining players A receive a flat payment of e3. We notify participants that it is
still optimal to choose as if their decision was implemented.
3.2.2 Procedural Details
In total, 263 subjects participated in our experiment at the Munich Experimental
Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) in June and July 2017.
7As it turns out, not a single participant decided to opt out in the Choice treatment.
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We conducted nine sessions of the Random treatment with 121 subjects and nine
session of the Choice treatment with 142 subjects. Our participants were university
students from various fields of study and randomly assigned to one treatment. We
used the online recruiting system “ORSEE” (Greiner, 2015) to recruit our subjects and
programmed and conducted the experiment with the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher,
2007). Each subjects participated in one session only.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received a printed version of the
instructions, which can be found in Appendix 3.5.3. The instructions were read aloud
such that it was common knowledge that all subjects received the same information.
Next, subjects had to answer a couple of control questions, and only after every subject
correctly answered all questions, the experiment proceeded.
At the end of the experiment, subjects anonymously answered a questionnaire
about whether one can trust people in general8 as well as socio-demographic charac-
teristics such as field of study, age, or sex. Our subjects are on average 23.11 years old
and 37.3% of them are male. After the experiment, subjects received their earnings,
which amounted to e8 on average, including a e5 show-up fee. An average session
lasted about 20 minutes.
3.2.3 Power Calculation
Given the number of relevant observations in the two treatments,9 we compute the
minimal detectable treatment effect size for lying behavior. We base our calculations
on a two-sided χ2-test of proportions and assume that the fraction of players A who lie
in Random is 41% (the actual fraction of liars). With a statistical power of 80% and a
8The question is taken from the World Value Survey and asks: “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The
answer to the question is to either support the former or the latter part of the question.
9We are only interested in players A who are able to lie to player B (83 in Random and 107 in
Choice). At the beginning of Section 3.3, we explain how we obtain these numbers.
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significance level of 5%, the minimal detectable treatment difference is 20 percentage
points. As this is certainly not a small treatment difference, one should be cautious
when interpreting insignificant treatment effects in our experiment.
3.3 Results
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether the choice to interact with someone
increases the probability of being lied to. This implies that we only analyze type A
individuals who had the possibility to lie to player B (i.e., they interacted with player B
and the computer displayed the low state on their screen).10 That leaves us with 190
relevant observations, 107 in the Choice treatment and 83 in the Random treatment.11
Based on these observations, Figure 3.2 depicts the fraction of liars, i.e., players A
who report the high state when actually having seen the low state, in both treatments.
We observe that subjects in Choice lie slightly more than in Random. However, the
treatment effect of 4.8 percentage points is statistically insignificant, which suggests
that subjects did not react to our treatment (p = 0.506, χ2-test, two-sided).12
Table 3.1 reports marginal effects of probit regressions with lying as dependent
variable.13 Column (1) is the parametric equivalent of Figure 3.2 as it only includes the
treatment dummy as explanatory variable. Supporting our non-parametric result, we
10Downward lying, i.e., seeing the high state but reporting the low state, did not occur. This is
in line with the literature. We are not aware of any study with a unilateral lying decision — thus,
excluding sender-receiver games, where strategic lying is possible (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2009)
— and direct lying observability that provides evidence for downward lying (see Kocher et al., 2017;
Gneezy et al., 2018). Concerning studies that infer lying behavior from an underlying probability
distribution, such as in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), we are only aware of one study that
reports downward lying (Utikal and Fischbacher, 2013). However, this finding can be attributed to the
specific subject pool of this experiment, namely nuns.
11In total, 219 of our participants were assigned to role A and 44 to role B.
12We also conduct a second power calculation based on the observed treatment difference and a
two-sided χ2-test of proportions. Given a power of 80%, this calculation reveals that we would require
3136 players A who are able to lie to player B in order to obtain a treatment effect which is significant
at the 5% level.
13Coefficients of the probit regression can be found in Table 3.2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Share of liars
find a positive but insignificant effect of having a choice on dishonesty. In a meta-study
which investigates 72 experimental studies on dishonesty, Abeler et al. (2016) find
gender to be the only socio-demographic background variable that affects dishonesty.
They report a positive and significant effect of being male on lying.14 Therefore,
we include a gender dummy in column (2) and find that also in our experiment,
males are significantly more likely to lie.15 Being female decreases the likelihood
of lying by 19 percentage points (p = 0.004). Interestingly, including an interaction
term between our treatment and gender in column (3) reveals that there is a highly
significant and sizeable treatment effect for males. They are 24.7 percentage points
more likely to lie at the expense of player B when player B chooses to interact with
player A as compared to when player B is randomly allocated to the interaction with
player A (p = 0.006). The sum of the treatment dummy “Choice” and the interaction
term “Choice × Female” yields the treatment effect for females, which is insignificant
14Comparing 63 economic and psychological experiments on dishonesty, Rosenbaum et al. (2014)
also find that lying is more prevalent among males than females.
15Again, we emphasize that this step of the analysis is exploratory.
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Table 3.1: Lying behavior. Probit marginal effects
Dependent variable Lying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice 0.048 0.074 0.247*** 0.372***
(0.049) (0.057) (0.091) (0.124)
Female −0.190*** −0.042 0.057
(0.066) (0.061) (0.090)
Choice × Female −0.284** −0.423**
(0.119) (0.190)
Economics/Business 0.233***
(0.088)
Trust −0.233**
(0.091)
Age −0.007
(0.009)
Math Grade −0.041
(0.040)
#Experiments 0.008
(0.008)
Observations 190 190 190 190
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.026 0.040 0.142
Notes: This table presents marginal effects at means from probit regressions with lying as indepen-
dent variable. Column (4) includes a dummy for whether being an economics or business student, a
dummy for whether one trusts people in general, age, “math grade”, which is the last grade in mathe-
matics during high school ranging from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient), as well as number of exper-
iments participated in so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses.
Stars indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(p = 0.621, F-test).16 In addition, the female dummy shows that gender does not play
a role in the Random treatment (p = 0.493). These results are robust to including
additional variables from the questionnaire in column (4). By doing so, we find that
economics and business students are 23.3 percentage more likely to lie than students
of other fields of study (p = 0.009). Furthermore, subjects who find other people
16One has to be cautious when using interaction terms in probit models since in this case, the
marginal effect of the interaction term is not the same as the interaction effect (Ai and Norton, 2003;
Greene, 2010). We therefore also manually calculate the interaction effect by taking the difference in
differences of the predicted values of lying separately for males and females in the Random and the
Choice treatment. As the difference in differences for the models in column (3) and (4) of Table 3.1
is very similar to the marginal effect of the interaction term in the respective column, our estimates
appear to be only marginally biased by using interaction terms in a probit model. Moreover, our results
are robust to using a linear probability model. These results are reported in Table 3.3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Share of liars separately for males and females
generally trustworthy are 23.3 percentage points less likely to engage in dishonest
behavior themselves (p = 0.011).17
As our regression analysis indicates that the treatment effect depends on
whether a player A is male, we replicate Figure 3.2 for males and females separately
in Figure 3.3. We observe a different reaction to the treatment depending on gender,
which is in line with our parametric results. While 43.2% of the males in the Random
treatment lie, this fraction significantly increases to 67.6% in the Choice treatment
(p = 0.039, χ2-test, two-sided). This amounts to a 56% increase in lying behavior.
In contrast, the fraction of liars does not differ across treatments among females
(p = 0.699, χ2-test, two-sided). In addition, there is no significant gender difference in
lying behavior in the Random treatment (p = 0.705, χ2-test, two-sided). These results
support the findings of our parametric analysis.
17Replicating column (4) with either interacting “Trust” or “Economics/Business” with “Choice”
instead of including the interaction term “Choice × Female” yields insignificant interaction effects.
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3.4 Conclusion
People who engage in dishonest behavior can take advantage of their private informa-
tion. At the same time, however, some individuals want to avoid a guilty conscience.
Therefore, they might justify their behavior with excuses in order to minimize the
moral costs of lying. In this chapter, we study whether choice can serve as such a
justification. We find a positive but insignificant average effect of the possibility to
self-select into a situation on the probability of being lied to.
Furthermore, our analysis reveals that females do not excuse dishonesty with
choice. In contrast, males are significantly more likely to lie to another person when
this person self-selected into an interaction with them. This increase is substantial
since it amounts to more than 50% of the baseline proportion of lying. Moreover,
the gender effect occurs in the Choice treatment only. The difference in dishonesty
between males and females is insignificant in the Random treatment. This is in line
with the mixed evidence on gender differences in lying behavior found in previous
studies. In addition, we find that economics and business students as well as subjects
who do not trust people in general are significantly more likely to lie.
There are several implications of our findings with regard to dishonesty of
males. First, the possibility to choose is a core value of Western societies. However,
our results suggest that this possibility to choose may come at the cost of inducing
dishonest behavior. In order to prevent fraudulent behavior, organizations might want
to frame interactions that entail the temptation to lie to another person in a way such
that the other person had no choice.
Second, regulatory measures should aim to avoid any redundant decision
making of the entity which should be protected. For instance, regulation in industries
that face inherent information asymmetries often includes the following feature. By
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law, firms need to retrieve certain characteristics from each customer. Depending on
these characteristics, a firm can offer a limited set of alternatives to the customer.
As an example, banks in Germany need to ask each client (among other things)
about risk preferences and investment horizon before offering them financial products.
Our results suggest that alternatives which are rather similar and only exist to give
customers the illusion of choice should be discouraged by regulation. In the previous
example, the bank may not offer several investment funds per risk-investment horizon
combination that pursue a similar strategy. In this way, it is harder for the bank
employee to keep up a positive self-image when selling unfit products with high
mark-ups, due to the reduced choice set of the client. This may lead the bank to
restructure its products in a more customer-oriented way.
Finally, our finding that only males excuse dishonest behavior with choice raises
the question whether this also holds true for other types of justification. It thus would
be interesting to explore whether females hide behind other excuses for immoral
behavior, such as not being pivotal (Falk and Szech, 2017) or that others also engage
in immoral behavior (Falk and Szech, 2013). In addition, it remains an open question
how our findings translate to non-student subject pools, and whether they depend on
cultural determinants.
3.4 Conclusion 60
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Tables
Table 3.2: Lying behavior. Probit coefficients
Dependent variable Lying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice 0.123 0.187 0.628*** 0.948***
(0.124) (0.146) (0.231) (0.316)
Female −0.483*** −0.106 0.146
(0.168) (0.154) (0.230)
Choice × Female −0.721** −1.078**
(0.299) (0.486)
Economics/Business 0.593***
(0.225)
Trust −0.592**
(0.234)
Age −0.018
(0.022)
Math Grade −0.105
(0.102)
#Experiments 0.020
(0.020)
Constant −0.228* 0.036 −0.170 0.214
(0.121) (0.153) (0.123) (0.505)
Observations 190 190 190 190
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.026 0.040 0.142
Notes: This table presents coefficients from probit regressions with lying as independent variable. Col-
umn (4) includes a dummy for whether being an economics or business student, a dummy for whether
one trusts people in general, age, “math grade”, which is the last grade in mathematics during high
school ranging from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient), as well as number of experiments participated
in so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate signif-
icance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.3: Lying behavior. Linear probability model
Dependent variable Lying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice 0.048 0.073 0.244** 0.328***
(0.049) (0.056) (0.086) (0.099)
Female −0.189*** −0.041 0.050
(0.065) (0.060) (0.081)
Choice × Female −0.279** −0.371**
(0.111) (0.150)
Economics/Business 0.214**
(0.080)
Trust −0.204**
(0.076)
Age −0.004
(0.006)
Math Grade −0.037
(0.034)
#Experiments 0.007
(0.007)
Constant 0.410*** 0.515*** 0.432*** 0.524***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.049) (0.133)
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.002 0.036 0.054 0.182
Notes: This table presents coefficients from regressions of a linear probability model with lying as in-
dependent variable. Column (4) includes a dummy for whether being an economics or business stu-
dent, a dummy for whether one trusts people in general, age, “math grade”, which is the last grade in
mathematics during high school ranging from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient), as well as number of
experiments participated in so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in paren-
theses. Stars indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.5 Appendix 62
3.5.2 Screenshots
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of how the color is displayed to player A
Figure 3.5: Screenshot of player A’s decision screen with orange being selected
3.5 Appendix 63
3.5.3 Instructions
[In paper form]18
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment serves to investigate economic decision making behavior. You can
earn money, which will be paid to you individually and in cash after the experiment
has ended.
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment,
please raise your hand or press the red button on your keyboard. We will then come
to you and answer your question in private.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions. Your own
decisions as well as the decisions of other participants can determine your payoffs.
These payoffs are determined according to the rules which are explained in the
following.
Payment
At the end of the experiment, you will receive in cash the money that you have earned
during the experiment. Additionally, you will receive 5 euro for showing up on time.
Therefore, we will call every participant based on his seat number, i.e., none of the
other participants gets to know your payment, and also you will not get to know the
payments of other participants.
18The instructions were translated from German. The original version is available upon request.
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Anonymity
Data from this experiment will be analyzed anonymously, i.e., we will never link your
name to the data of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a
receipt confirming that you received your payment. This receipt serves accounting
purposes only.
Assignment of Roles
There are two different roles in this experiment: A and B. The role of each participant
is determined randomly. Whether you are participant A or B will be communicated to
you at a later point in time on your screen.
Matching of the Participants
After all participants were assigned to their role, the computer will randomly assign
one or several participants A to one participant B.
In case you are participant A, the computer will randomly determine whether your
decision or the decision of another participant A will be implemented.
Participants A whose decisions are not implemented receive 3 euros. Participants A
whose decisions are implemented can determine their payment and possibly the
payment of participant B.
Since each participant A is informed whether his decision is implemented only at the
end of the experiment, it is optimal for participant A to decide as if their decision will
in fact be implemented.
Your Task
Participant B’s Decision
[Random treatment only]
At the beginning of the experiment, participant B is randomly assigned to either
interacting with participant A or to receiving an alternative payment. If participant B
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is not assigned to the interaction, he receives an alternative payment of 1.05 euros.
The probability of participant B not being assigned to the interaction is 5%.
If participant B is assigned to the interaction, his payment depends on participant A’s
decision in the following way:
[Choice treatment only]
At the beginning of the experiment, participant B decides in favor of or against
an interaction with participant A. If participant B does not interact, he receives an
alternative payment of e1.05.
If participant B decides in favor of the interaction, his payment depends on partici-
pant A’s decision in the following way:
[both treatments]
Participant A’s Decision
The computer randomly draws a ball from a urn which contains 90 balls of the color
orange and 10 balls of the color green. Therefore, the probability that a ball of the
color orange is drawn is 90%, whereas it is 10% for the color green.
The color of the drawn ball is shown to participant A but not to participant B. It is the
task of participant A to remember this color and report it on the screen later in the
experiment.
If participant A reports to have seen orange, participant A receivese1 and participant B
e5. If participant A reports to have seen green, participant A receives e5 and
participant B e1.
Reported color→ Orange Green
Payment Participant A 1 Euro 5 Euro
Payment Participant B 5 Euro 1 Euro
[Random treatment only]
If participant B has not been assigned to the interaction with participant A, partic-
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ipant A determines his earnings with his decision in the same way. Participant B,
however, always receives e1.05 in this case.
[Choice treatment only]
If participant B decides against interacting with participant A, participant A deter-
mines his earnings with his decision in the same way. Participant B, however, always
receives e1.05 in this case.
[both treatments]
Reported color→ Orange Green
Payment Participant A 1 Euro 5 Euro
Payment Participant B 1.05 Euro 1.05 Euro
Comprehension Questions
In case you are participant A and your decision is implemented:
What happens if you report to have seen green?
1. I receive e1.05.
2. I receive e5.
3. I receive e1.
What happens if you report to have seen orange and the participant B assigned to you
has been assigned to interacting with you? [Random treatment]
What happens if you report to have seen orange and the participant B assigned to you
decides to interact with you? [Choice treatment]
1. I receive e5 and participant B e1.
2. I receive e1 and participant B e5.
3. I receive e5 and participant B e1.05.
In case you are participant B:
What happens if you have been assigned to receiving the alternative payment? [Ran-
dom treatment]
3.5 Appendix 67
What happens if you decide against interacting with participant A? [Choice treat-
ment]
1. I receive e1.05 and participant A receives e5.
2. I receive e1.05 and participant A receives e5 or e1 euro, depending on which
color he reports.
3. I receive e5 and participant B e1.
What happens if you have been assigned to interacting with participant A? [Random
treatment]
What happens if you decide in favor of interacting with participant A? [Choice treat-
ment]
1. I receive e1.05.
2. I receive e5 euros if participant A reports orange.
3. I receive e5 euros if participant A reports green.
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4Blaming the Refugees?Experimental Evidence on
Responsibility Attribution
Joint with Stefan Grimm
“You know what a disaster this massive immigration has been to Germany and the
people of Germany — crime has risen to levels that no one thought they would ever see.”
U.S. president Donald Trump on refugees in Germany1
4.1 Introduction
Europe experienced a large inflow of refugees in 2015. As a consequence, a heated
debate about whether to tolerate large refugee inflows or whether to instead close
borders arose in both the U.S. and Europe. As reflected by the quote of U.S. president
Donald Trump at the beginning of this chapter, this discussion focuses to a large
extent on whether refugees are responsible for negative outcomes such as rising
crime rates, adverse aggregate employment, or poor economic development. Some
suggest such responsibility, while others argue against it and accuse their opponents
of xenophobic attitudes.2 Despite the relevance of discrimination against refugees
for social and economic outcomes, surprisingly little is known about whether natives
indeed blame refugees for undesired events, and if so, whether this is caused by
statistical discrimination.
1https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/16/trump-says-german-
crime-levels-have-risen-and-refugees-are-to-blame-not-exactly (last accessed on March 8,
2018).
2Besides the article in The Washington Post referred to in footnote 1, see https:
//www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/europe/refugees-arrest-turns-a-crime-into-
national-news-and-debate-in-germany.html (last accessed on March 8, 2018).
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We address these questions by implementing a laboratory experiment with
refugees who are placed in Munich, Germany. German participants are randomly
paired either with another German or a refugee. This allows us to provide clean
evidence on differences in responsibility attribution and to shed light on mechanisms
of discrimination in this context. More precisely, our subjects receive a positive or a
negative income shock. This shock is either due to a random draw or the partner’s
performance in a real effort task, which took place before the main part of the
experiment. If the partner actually is responsible for the shock — unbeknownst to the
participant — and his performance was high enough to pass a certain threshold, a
positive income shock occurs. In contrast, low performance implies a negative shock
when the partner is responsible. After displaying the individual income shocks to the
participants, we elicit beliefs about responsibility, i.e., whether the matched partner
or the random draw was responsible — our core outcome measure. To investigate
whether our results are driven by statistical discrimination, we further elicit beliefs
about the partner’s performance.3
This setup closely relates to many situations in which responsibility has to
be assigned while there is uncertainty with respect to the actual cause. Consider,
for example, employee evaluations. Increasing or decreasing sales can arise directly
from the performance of an employee or be due to general shifts in demand. Layoff
or promotion as well as bonus and raise decisions will crucially depend on the
supervisor’s assessment of this responsibility. However, responsibility attribution is not
only essential for an individual’s success once in a certain position, it can also critically
affect the chances of being hired in the first place. The interpretation of a vita’s
quality signals — for example whether good performance evaluations refer to the
3In the literature, the term statistical discrimination is most often used for discrimination based
on actual differences in characteristics or behavior between different groups (e.g., Fershtman and
Gneezy, 2001). Since our subjects have no information about average performances of Germans and
refugees, we instead refer to discrimination based on (potentially inaccurate) beliefs about different
performances as statistical discrimination.
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individual’s performance or merely to lenient HR policies — but also the assessment
of late arrivals to interviews or sickness strongly affect hiring decisions. For all good
and bad outcomes, many explanations for responsibility of either the candidate or
“nature” are possible. Differing attribution behavior for refugees compared to natives
can consequently have a major impact on refugees’ labor market integration efforts.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate such discrimination in
responsibility attribution, do so by inviting refugees — a highly relevant group for
that matter — to the laboratory and implement a new experimental paradigm.
We do not observe discrimination against the outgroup of refugees by blam-
ing them for negative outcomes. Quite the contrary can be inferred from our data.
Refugees are treated more favorably than Germans. They are held responsible rela-
tively more often for positive and less often for negative shocks. Actual performance
differences and beliefs about the performance of Germans and refugees cannot explain
this difference. Hence, statistical discrimination does not explain our result of reverse
discrimination. Furthermore, we measure implicit associations towards Arabic names
and show that, despite our finding of reverse discrimination, Germans on average have
negative implicit associations towards Arabic names. Indicating a positive relationship
between implicit attitudes and explicit attribution behavior, subjects with positive
implicit associations favor refugees more than subjects with negative associations. In
addition, we do not find any evidence for reverse discrimination in a second experi-
ment, in which we assign Germans to artificial in- and outgroups. This shows that our
findings from the first experiment are driven by our natural outgroup of refugees and
are not a result of our experimental design per se.
Discrimination affects a wide range of social and economic outcomes and comes
in many forms and domains. For instance, discrimination can result in disadvantages
for education and health related outcomes (e.g., Heckman, 1998; Shapiro et al., 2013;
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Krieger, 2014) as well as in obstacles to participate in the labor market (e.g., Goldin
and Rouse, 2000; Carneiro et al., 2005; Lang and Manove, 2011). This chapter
abstracts from these different domains and sheds light on a specific form of discrimina-
tion that has not been studied yet — responsibility attribution. Our design also allows
us to distinguish between statistical and other types of discrimination and hence to
talk about the channels for discriminatory behavior. Other experimental papers have
specifically looked at a variety of underlying mechanisms, too.4 Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001) investigate trust and social preferences of ingroup and outgroup members in
the Israeli society. Using the investment, dictator, and ultimatum game, they find clear
stereotypes associated with different ethnic groups leading to discriminatory behavior.
Ockenfels and Werner (2014) provide related evidence on ingroup favoritism. They
show that people share more of their endowment in a dictator game when paired
with an ingroup member, which indicates an explanation based on social preferences.
Similarly, Chen and Li (2009) report increased altruism towards ingroup members
in allocation games for different measures of social preferences, e.g., punishment for
misbehavior. In stark contrast to these papers, we do not observe ingroup favoritism
or discrimination “against” the outgroup but document reverse discrimination.
We also contribute more generally to the understanding of how responsibility
is attributed per se. Bartling and Fischbacher (2011) and Bartling et al. (2015) show
that responsibility can be effectively shifted through the delegation of choice and not
being pivotal. This evidence indicates that responsibility attribution is malleable and
that there is scope for discrimination in attribution behavior.
The much more extensive literature on responsibility attribution in psychology
focuses on whether individuals attribute explicit behaviors to internal characteristics
or situational factors. Ross (1977) coined the term “fundamental attribution error”,
4For a meta-study on economic experiments on discrimination, see Lane (2016).
4.1 Introduction 72
which presumes the tendency to underestimate the role of external circumstances
when judging others’ behavior. Jones and Harris (1967), the original paper to address
this issue, investigate subjects’ assessments of a writer’s private opinion of Fidel
Castro. Although subjects know that the writer was randomly told to either praise or
criticize Castro in an essay, they rated the writer’s opinion as more favorable towards
Castro when he had written a pro-Castro text. Hence, subjects wrongfully attributed
responsibility for the content of the text to the writer. Pettigrew (1979) relates this bias
to ingroup favoritism and hence discriminatory behavior calling it “ultimate attribution
error”. Negative actions by an outgroup member will more likely be attributed to
personal causes, whereas positive actions are more likely attributed to external factors
(e.g., luck or “the exceptional case”) compared to actions by an ingroup member
(for an extensive review see Hewstone, 1990). In contrast to this literature, we do
not study whether internal or external factors cause individual behavior. This would
correspond, for example, to attributing responsibility for an employee’s explicit action.
That is, the supervisor knows that the sales manager hired an excellent sales rep but
can either attribute this to excellent knowledge of human nature or to mere luck.
Instead, we investigate whether an event where the true underlying cause is unknown
— who hired the sales rep — is attributed to an individual or something else — the
specific sales manager or someone else.
As our subjects are willing to sacrifice part of their payoffs in order not to
blame refugees, our finding is not compatible with the standard economic model
of purely self-interested agents. Instead, we interpret our results as being in line
with theories of economics of identity and motivated beliefs. In such a framework,
people care about a positive self-image or generally want to behave according to
certain prescriptions pertaining to their identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). These
concerns can affect behavior and may lead to self-serving beliefs over behavior of
other people (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2015). For our context, it is important that being
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open and tolerant towards minorities and refugees is part of the social identity of
many people, presumably especially in our student sample. Hence, identity concerns
might motivate our participants to attribute responsibility more positively towards
refugees since blaming refugees is clearly associated with xenophobic attitudes.5 We
also favor this interpretation because in our anonymous laboratory setting, we rule
out social image concerns as much as possible.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the experimental design in detail. Section 4.3 presents our results on responsibility
attribution. Section 4.4 is about a robustness experiment that we ran with artificially
formed groups. Section 4.5 discusses our main finding and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Experimental Procedures and Design
4.2.1 Procedural Details
We programmed and conducted the experiment with “z-Tree" (Fischbacher, 2007).
Germans, 152 students from various fields of study, were recruited using the online
recruiting system “ORSEE" (Greiner, 2015). Additionally, 43 refugees were recruited
in Munich with leaflets at refugees camps, in front of local registration offices, and in
cooperation with the NGO Social Impact Recruiting (SIR).6 Figure 4.7 in the Appendix
shows an English version of the leaflet.
5For instance, see http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/justin-welby-is-wrong-it-is-
racist-to-blame-migrants-for-your-fears-about-jobs-and-wages-a6925106.html (last ac-
cessed on March 8, 2018).
6SIR supports refugees in finding a job by creating a German CV, preparing for interviews, and
contacting employers. For further information see http://si-recruiting.org/ (last accessed on
March 8, 2018).
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Because the vast majority of SIR clients and most of the refugees arriving in
Germany were male, we decided to restrict the sample to male refugees.7 Conse-
quently, we also invited only male Germans to have single sex pairs in both ingroups
and outgroups such that we did not have to control for potential gender effects. In
addition, we wanted our refugee subjects to be of roughly the same age as our other
participants. Hence, only refugees between the age of 18 and 29 were invited to
participate in the experiment. To have a relatively homogeneous outgroup that repre-
sents the majority of refugees in Germany, we only invited Arabic native speakers.8 To
also have a homogeneous ingroup, we only invited native participants with a German
sounding name. This ensured that participants assigned to an ingroup member indeed
regarded the matched participant as ingroup member.9
All 10 experimental sessions took place at the Munich Experimental Laboratory
for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich from August
to November 2016. The assignment to the seats in the laboratory made clear that
there were two different groups in the experiment. Refugees had to draw a card with
a seat number from a bag with the label “Arabic” (in Arabic letters) and Germans from
a bag with the label “German” (in German). The cards ensured that the participants
were seated in front of a computer screen with instructions in the respective language.
Within each group, subjects were randomly assigned to a seat. An English version of
the instructions is included in Appendix 4.7.5. Refugees were invited to the experiment
half an hour earlier than Germans to make sure they knew what to expect and to
7See page 21 of the German report of the German Federal Office for Migra-
tion and Refugees: http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/
bundesamt-in-zahlen-2015.html (last accessed on March 8, 2018).
8German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/
EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015-zentrale-ergebnisse (last
accessed on March 8, 2018).
9All refugees indeed had Arabic names. See Section 4.7.1 in the Appendix for a complete list of
first names of all participants. At the time of writing this chapter, only roughly 3% of our regular
subjects registered for experiments at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social
Sciences (MELESSA) had Arabic sounding names. It therefore should have been clear to our German
participants that they were matched with a refugee when their partner’s name was Arabic sounding.
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check reading and writing proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic.10 Announcements
before and during the experiment were repeated in Arabic by two student research
assistants. If necessary, they answered questions by the refugees individually at the
subjects’ seats. Questions of Germans were answered by the experimenter.
For the main part of the experiment, we formed ingroup and outgroup pairs. As
we do not focus on how refugees attribute responsibility, we denote Germans matched
with another German as belonging to the German treatment (ingroup) and Germans
matched with a refugee as belonging to the Refugee treatment (outgroup). In order
to increase the number of decisions taken by Germans, we matched each refugee
with up to two Germans. Group assignment of Germans was random conditional on
assigning the same number of Germans to the treatments German and Refugee.11 At
the beginning of the main part of the experiment, subjects needed to enter their first
name, which was then shown to their matched partner and enabled all subjects to
identify their partner’s group affiliation.12
At the end of the experiment, the participants answered a questionnaire about
socio-demographic characteristics. Thereafter, all subjects were paid privately and
earned e12.3 on average, including a fixed payment of e6 for showing up on time.
The sessions lasted between 60 and 75 minutes. Each subject participated in one
session only.
10Some refugees could not participate in the experiment since they indicated that they were not
sufficiently able to read and spell.
11Only even numbers of German subjects participated in the sessions. If dividing the number of
German subjects into two groups of equal size resulted in an odd number, groups were formed such
that there were two more Germans matched with a refugee than with another German. For instance,
in a session with 18 Germans, 10 of them were matched with a refugee.
12Loss of anonymity is not a concern despite identification via names. In the questionnaire at the
end of the experiment, only 6% of German participants indicated that they knew another participant in
their session. Further and more importantly, there is no pair of matched participants where both of the
subjects indicated to know somebody else in the session.
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4.2.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, subjects received a flat fee
of e3 for performing a real effort task. They solved up to eight simple (6×4) jigsaw
puzzles (henceforth puzzles) within ten minutes. The puzzles were placed next to
the keyboard and were covered by a sheet of paper at every seat. Subjects were
asked not to touch the stack until the experimenter had indicated to begin. We chose
puzzle motives to be culturally neutral (see Figure 4.8 in the Appendix). This real
effort task has the advantage of being familiar to participants from different parts of
the world. We could not use a computer-based task because many of the refugees
were not familiar with working with a personal computer.13 Furthermore, many
Germans arguably would have expected a large performance difference between
refugees and Germans. Importantly, at the time of solving the puzzles, participants
knew nothing about the content of the rest of the experiment. At the end of part
one, the experimenter and student research assistants quietly counted the number of
correctly solved puzzles at the subjects’ seats.
For the second and main part of the experiment, subjects were randomly paired
with another participant in the experiment into ingroup (both subjects Germans) and
outgroup pairs (one German and refugee each). Prior to making any decisions in
the second part of the experiment, subjects received an income shock. Figure 4.1
illustrates the income generating process. Player A faced a positive or negative
income shock. He either received e5 or e5 were subtracted from his experimental
earnings.14 However, player A did not know how this shock came about. With an
ex-ante probability of 50%, this shock was due to the performance of player B (the
matched participant) and otherwise due to nature. If player B’s performance was
13In the first three sessions, we asked refugees whether they are familiar with puzzles before the
start of the experiment. All of them confirmed.
14Subjects knew that their total earnings from the experiment would be a positive amount.
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Figure 4.1: Income generating process
responsible for the income shock, the shock was positive if player B’s number of
correctly solved puzzles was at least four and negative otherwise. In the case of nature
being responsible for the income shock, one of the two shocks was randomly chosen
with equal probability. Furthermore, player B’s payoff was not affected by whether
player A received a positive or negative shock.
The income shock was independently generated for both subjects within each
pair, i.e., every subject was player A and player B. Subjects were fully aware of the
setup. All participants had to answer four control questions correctly before starting
the main part of the experiment to make sure they fully understood the income
generating process.
Subsequently, in the first belief elicitation, subjects guessed whether nature or
player B’s performance caused the income shock and received e5 if their guess was
correct. This allows us to identify differences in responsibility attribution to Germans
and refugees and is our main variable of interest. In order to get a more precise mea-
sure of responsibility attribution, we additionally asked for the participants’ confidence
in their own guess in a second belief elicitation. More specifically, participants filled
out a 9-item choice list with two options (A and B) for each of the nine choices (based
on Becker et al., 1964, henceforth BDM). If they chose option A and the respective
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choice became payoff relevant, they received e5 if their chosen mechanism (in the
first belief elicitation) was indeed responsible for the shock (player B or nature).
Option A was the same for all nine choices. Option B gave them the chance to receive
e5 with probabilities ranging from 10% to 90% in 10% increments. If a participant,
for example, expected player B to be responsible in the first elicitation and switched
to option B in row seven, he assigned between 60% and 70% probability to the event
that player B indeed was responsible.
In addition, we elicited binary beliefs about performance to see whether po-
tential differences in responsibility attribution stem from statistical discrimination.
We asked whether subjects believed that the matched player’s performance passed
the threshold of four solved puzzles or not (again incentivized with e5). Finally,
we asked for the probability player A assigned to the matched participant having
solved at least four puzzles. Again, subjects faced a (BDM-based) choice list with nine
choices between option A, i.e., receiving e5 if the partner’s performance was at or
above the cutoff, and option B, i.e., receiving e5 with given probabilities ranging from
10% to 90%. Hence, in total, we elicited four incentivized beliefs. At the end of the
experiment, in order to prevent hedging, one of these belief questions was randomly
chosen for payment and either paid e5 or nothing.
The order of the four belief elicitations, however, was not the same in all
sessions. In half of the sessions, we elicited performance beliefs before explaining the
income generating process. Hence, in these sessions (henceforth Uncond), participants
first worked on the puzzles, were then matched with a partner and directly asked
for the two (unconditional) performance beliefs regarding the partner (binary choice
and choice list). Only then the income generating process was explained and the
shock realized. In the other half of the sessions (henceforth Cond), (conditional)
performance beliefs were elicited after the income generating process had been
4.2 Experimental Procedures and Design 79
Treatment Uncond
Pu
zz
le
Gr
ou
p
fo
rm
ati
on
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
be
lie
f
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
Sh
oc
k
ex
pla
na
tio
n
Sh
oc
k
re
ali
za
tio
n
Re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y
be
lie
f
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y
Treatment Cond
Pu
zz
le
Gr
ou
p
fo
rm
ati
on
Sh
oc
k
ex
pla
na
tio
n
Sh
oc
k
re
ali
za
tio
n
Re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y
be
lie
f
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
be
lie
f
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
Figure 4.2: Timeline of the experiment
explained, the shock had realized, and after subjects had attributed responsibility. This
allows us — by comparing performance beliefs in the treatments Uncond and Cond —
to examine whether subjects formed distorted or motivated beliefs after observing
the shock and attributing responsibility. For instance, assume that a subject attributes
responsibility to the partner after observing a negative shock. If this subject is asked
about his performance belief, he could justify his attribution behavior by stating low
performance beliefs, although he actually thinks that the partner passed the cutoff.
Hence, we had a 2×2 treatment design along the dimensions group assignment
and task order. Figure 4.2 provides an overview of task orders in the respective
treatments.
After these two main parts of the experiment, participants performed the Im-
plicit Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit associations towards Arabic names.
Subjects had to assign positive (e.g., “appealing”, “love”, “cheer”) or negative ex-
pressions (e.g., “selfish”, “dirty”, “bothersome”) to Arabic or Caucasian names by
pressing keys on their keyboard. The IAT score, which indicates positive or negative
associations towards Arabic names, is calculated based on response times to sort
names to expressions. If a subject needed more time to assign positive expressions
and less to assign negative expressions to Arabic compared to Caucasian names, the
IAT score is below zero indicating negative implicit attitudes towards Arabic names.
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This task has been shown to relate to various dimensions of field behavior such as job
recruitment (see Greenwald et al. (2009) for a meta study). We used FreeIAT, a free
software to run IATs.15 Subjects were paid e2 for completing the IAT.
4.3 Results
Our main results on the comparison of responsibility attribution by group assignment
over all sessions combined are reported in Section 4.3.1. This abstracts from potential
systematic differences between Uncond and Cond, which we analyze in 4.3.2 sepa-
rately. Section 4.3.3 presents evidence for heterogeneity using scores from the Implicit
Association Test. Section 4.3.4 reports results using the BDM-based probability mea-
sures of our main outcome variable and performance beliefs. Unless stated otherwise,
all our results in this section consider attribution behavior of our German participants
only.
4.3.1 Favorable Responsibility Attribution
Since we test whether our subjects assign responsibility less, equally or more favorably
to Germans or refugees, i.e., whether there is discrimination in attribution behavior,
we define the binary variable favorable attribution. We denote responsibility attri-
bution as favorable if a positive shock occurs and the matched partner is believed
to be responsible for the shock. Attribution is also favorable if a negative shock is
observed and responsibility is assigned to nature. In contrast, attributing responsibility
to the matched partner after a negative shock or to nature after a positive shock
implies unfavorable attribution.16 This simplification ignores potential asymmetries in
15http://www4.ncsu.edu/~awmeade/FreeIAT/FreeIAT.htm (last accessed on March 8, 2018).
16The intuition underlying this distinction is rational behavior based on bayesian belief updating.
Nature and the matched partner are ex-ante responsible with equal probability (prior). Given nature is
responsible, positive and negative shocks occur with equal probability. Hence, if a participant expects
the matched partner to having solved four or more puzzles and thus assigns a probability larger
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Figure 4.3: Favorable attribution depending on group affiliation
behavior after positive versus negative income shocks. We will show later that our
results hold for both shock directions.
Figure 4.3 displays favorable attribution by group affiliation. Germans matched
with another German (n = 72) equally often attribute responsibility favorably and un-
favorably. In stark contrast to that, Germans matched with a refugee (n = 80) attribute
responsibility favorably in roughly two thirds of the cases. This difference in attribu-
tion behavior is statistically significant (p = 0.042, χ2-test, two-sided) and evidence
for reverse discrimination, i.e., a positive bias towards the refugee outgroup.
Under bayesian updating, favorable attribution represents the belief about the
matched partner having solved at least four puzzles. Hence, the results displayed in
Figure 4.3 could be driven by performance beliefs depending on group affiliation. We
would expect more favorable attribution in Refugee if subjects believed that refugees
than 50% to this event, he should attribute responsibility favorably (posterior). Therefore, under the
assumption of bayesian updating, favorable attribution captures underlying beliefs about the partner
reaching the puzzle cutoff.
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are better than Germans in solving puzzles. However, comparing performance beliefs
reveals no significant difference. If anything, Germans expect refugees to perform
slightly worse, which renders reverse discrimination even more pronounced. While
43% of Germans matched with a refugee expect the refugee to have solved at least
four puzzles, 51% of Germans matched with another German have high performance
beliefs (p = 0.273, χ2-test, two-sided).17 This indicates that the asymmetry in responsi-
bility attribution cannot be rationally based on performance beliefs. In Figure 4.4, we
compare actual favorable responsibility attribution (favorable attribution) and rational
favorable responsibility attribution (rational attribution). We define rational attribu-
tion to be one if the German participant has high performance beliefs regarding the
matched partner and zero otherwise. Figure 4.4 shows that while actual responsibility
attribution is on average in line with performance beliefs for Germans matched with
another German, attribution is clearly more favorable than dictated by performance
beliefs for Germans matched with refugees.18 The difference in Refugee is significant
(p < 0.01, McNemar test, two-sided).19
Next, we control for the direction of the income shock. Since the actual
performance of refugees was much worse than that of Germans, Germans in Refugee
observe negative shocks much more often. Hence, more favorable attribution after
negative shocks, independent of group affiliation, could explain our results. However,
17With our sample size, we have 80% power to detect an effect size on the 5% significance level
that implies a belief difference of around 22 percentage points. Actual performance differences are
much more pronounced. While 47% of the Germans solve four or more puzzles, only 2.3% of the
refugees (1 out of 43) reached the performance cutoff. Therefore, statistical discrimination based on
actual behavior would imply much more favorable attribution to Germans and thus cannot explain our
results.
18We cannot analyze refugee behavior by group affiliation since refugees are only matched with
Germans. While this is not the interest of this chapter and we do not have adequate power to detect
patterns, 51.2% attribute responsibility favorably, whereas only 9.3% of them believe that their partner
made the performance cutoff.
19These findings are robust to comparing attribution behavior with the individual’s own performance.
While own performance need not necessarily be a perfect proxy for beliefs regarding the performance
of the other, performance is certainly orthogonal to treatment — unlike beliefs that could potentially
be affected by treatment. We will extensively discuss this in Section 4.3.2.
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Figure 4.4: Favorable attribution and rational attribution implied by beliefs
the shock direction does not drive our finding. For both negative and positive shocks,
there is a clear asymmetry by group affiliation in terms of how performance beliefs
translate into responsibility attribution (see Figure 4.9 in the Appendix). Importantly,
there is no evidence for blaming the refugees in case of negative shocks. We observe
the contrary. Refugees are attributed responsibility much more favorably after a
negative shock compared to rational attribution based on performance beliefs (p <
0.01, McNemar test, two-sided).
To verify the robustness of our non-parametric results, we run different regres-
sion models. The regression framework helps us to further understand attribution
behavior by explicitly measuring the effects of beliefs and shock direction on favorable
attribution while being able to control for observables, too. Table 4.1 reports marginal
effects from probit regressions on our binary variable favorable attribution.
Column (1) is the parametric equivalent to Figure 4.3 replicating the significant
positive effect of being matched with a refugee on favorable attribution. This is
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Table 4.1: Favorable responsibility attribution
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee 0.160*** 0.195*** 0.155*** 0.146***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.040) (0.038)
Belief high 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.375***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.068)
Neg shock 0.164** 0.158**
(0.064) (0.064)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 152 152 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.149 0.172 0.179
Notes: Probit regressions on favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects. Column (4) in-
cludes additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of experiments so far
(all insignificant). Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indi-
cate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
indicated by the binary variable Refugee, which is equal to one if a subject is matched
with a refugee and zero otherwise. Column (2), equivalent to Figure 4.4, controls for
performance beliefs with belief high as binary variable. Belief high is equal to one if a
subject believes that the partner passed the cutoff and zero otherwise. The effect of
group affiliation remains highly significant and sizable. Being matched with a refugee
increases the likelihood to attribute responsibility favorably by 19.5 percentage points.
The effect in model (2) is slightly larger than in model (1), which is in line with
our non-parametric results. As performance beliefs are slightly worse for refugees,
controlling for beliefs increases the effect of group affiliation. Reassuringly, high
performance beliefs lead to more favorable responsibility attribution. Subjects who
believe that the partner passed the cutoff are 37.2 percentage points more likely to
exhibit favorable attribution. As motivated above, we include the shock direction in
column (3) with neg shock as binary variable. It is equal to one if a negative shock
occurs and zero otherwise. We find a significant positive effect of negative shocks
indicating that participants attribute responsibility generally more favorably after a
4.3 Results 85
negative shock. However, this does not alter our finding regarding group affiliation.
Finally, our results are robust to controlling for personal background variables in
column (4).
Result 1: Germans attribute responsibility more favorably to refugees than to other
German participants. This cannot be explained by differing performance beliefs and holds
for behavior after both negative and positive shocks.
4.3.2 Unconditional vs. Conditional Beliefs
Participants in our Cond treatment were asked to state their performance beliefs after
observing the shock and after attributing responsibility. Hence, in order to justify
attribution in front of themselves, participants may report distorted beliefs. To quantify
this potential distortion, we ran half of the sessions with performance beliefs elicited
before shock realization and responsibility attribution (Uncond).
To investigate whether performance beliefs are distorted, we relate these beliefs
to own performance — measured by whether the individual solved at least four puzzles.
Own performance serves as a benchmark for beliefs regarding others’ performances
and hence should be the main driver for performance beliefs. This hypothesis is
supported by our data. In German, 50% pass the puzzle cutoff and 51% expect the
matched partner to having done so. In Refugee, 45% of Germans solve at least four
puzzles and 43% expect that from the matched partner. Only roughly one fourth of
our subjects, both in German and Refugee, does not believe the matched participant
to have performed in the same way as they did. Figure 4.5 displays average own
performance, beliefs in the other’s performance (i.e., rational attribution), and actual
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Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution, rational attribution, and the fraction of partici-
pants reaching the puzzle cutoff (own performance) by group affiliation for the treatments
Cond (left panel) and Uncond (right panel). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.5: Favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance
responsibility attribution (favorable attribution) by group affiliation and task ordering
(Uncond vs. Cond) separately.20
Performance beliefs cannot be distorted by knowledge about our responsibility
attribution task in Uncond. In this case, displayed in the right panel of Figure 4.5,
Germans expect other Germans on average to perform slightly better than themselves
and refugees to be slightly worse. Compared to that, performance beliefs seem
distorted in Cond. Beliefs of ingroup members are slightly lower than own performance,
while they are higher for Germans in Refugee. On average, Germans matched with a
refugee in Uncond are 7.5 percentage points less likely to believe in the performance
of their partner compared to their own performance. However, German outgroup
participants in Cond are 2.5 percentage points more likely to believe in the performance
20This reveals that randomization was not successful with regard to puzzle performance. A signifi-
cantly larger fraction of subjects in Uncond pass the performance cutoff than subjects in Cond (p < 0.01,
χ2-test, two-sided). Table 4.6 in the Appendix shows the sample balance.
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of the refugee than in their own. Hence, the difference in the differences between
own performance and performance beliefs over the two treatments for subjects in
Refugee is 0.1. This corresponds to a positive belief distortion in favor of refugees once
knowing the income generating process. Performing the same difference in differences
calculation for subjects in German, we find a difference in differences of 0.14 that
shows worse performance beliefs in Cond (negative distortion against other Germans).
While this 24 percentage points difference in distortion between German and Refugee
is considerate, it is insignificant (p = 0.151, t-test, two-sided).21
Hence, under the assumption of unbiased beliefs in Uncond our findings from
Section 4.3.1 provide a lower bound for the extent of reverse discrimination. The
results from this section indicate that true underlying beliefs in Cond could actually
be worse for refugees and better for other Germans than stated in the belief elicita-
tion. This would increase the asymmetry between rational and actual responsibility
attribution beyond what we measure in Section 4.3.1.
Result 2: We find no significant evidence for subjects stating distorted beliefs. However,
if anything, the results point towards favorably distorted beliefs with respect to refugees,
suggesting that the results from the pooled sample (Section 4.3.1) constitute a lower
bound for reverse discrimination.
The assumption in this section is that beliefs in Uncond are unbiased. This
seems reasonable since participants are unaware of the rest of the experiment in
this treatment when stating their guess about their partner’s performance. However,
unconditional performance beliefs regarding refugees could already be distorted
upwards such that true underlying performance beliefs would actually be lower. If
21This calculation is equivalent to regressing the individual difference between rational attribution
(performance beliefs) and own performance in an OLS estimation on Refugee, Cond, and their interaction
term Refugee×Cond. The interaction term shows the 24 percentage points distortion for Germans
matched to refugees once they know the income generating process.
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this was the case, our overall finding of reverse discrimination would again be a
lower bound of the true discrimination. Given true performance beliefs, the difference
between these beliefs and responsibility attribution would be larger than the one we
find with stated beliefs. In contrast to that, performance beliefs could also be biased
downwards and explain our result of reverse discrimination. This, however, seems
very unlikely because it would imply discrimination at the level of performance beliefs
— by stating lower than actual beliefs about performance for refugees — and, to the
contrary, reverse discrimination at the level of responsibility attribution. Furthermore,
it is implausible that participants have such extremely inaccurate beliefs given that
refugees actually perform very poorly in the real effort task.
To account for the possibility of biased performance beliefs, we substitute these
beliefs by own performance to check the robustness of our main findings. Table 4.7 in
the Appendix reports results from regressions replicating Table 4.1 while using each
participant’s number of correctly solved puzzles as explanatory variable instead of his
performance beliefs.22 The results for Refugee from all models are strikingly similar to
the ones from Table 4.1, which renders our finding of reverse discrimination robust to
performance belief distortions.
4.3.3 Implicit Associations
The key personal characteristic that we elicit and correlate with attribution behavior
relates to implicit associations. The IAT measures people’s relative implicit associations
towards a specific group compared to a baseline group. In our case, it is a measure
of associations towards Arabic names relative to Caucasian names.23 A positive test
22Alternatively, using a binary variable for whether the respective participant solved at least four
puzzles does not change the significance of the Refugee or neg shock indicators.
23Arabic names are Hakim, Sharif, Yousef, Wahib, Akbar, Muhsin, Salim, Karim, Habib, and Ashraf,
and Caucasian Names are Ernesto, Matthais, Maarten, Philippe, Guillame, Benoit, Takuya, Kazuki,
Chaiyo, and Marcelo. Positive associations are Excellent, Cheer, Delight, Joyous, Excitement, Cherish,
Friendship, and Beautiful, and negative associations are Hate, Pain, Gross, Failure, Rotten, Humiliate,
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score implies relatively positive associations towards Arabic names, while a negative
score indicates the opposite.
Overall, the results from the IAT are in line with ingroup favoritism. While
72% of Germans have a negative IAT and hence relatively more negative associations
towards Arabic names, this is the case for only 12% of the refugees (p < 0.01, χ2-test,
two-sided).24
Importantly, implicit attitudes have predictive power for explicit discrimina-
tion behavior. People with negative IAT scores favor refugees less with regard to
responsibility attribution. 83% of Germans with a positive IAT in Refugee attribute
responsibility favorably, while only 59% with a negative IAT do so. This difference is
significant (p = 0.034, χ2-test, two-sided).
To test the correlation between implicit associations and favorable attribution
when holding other variables constant, we further apply a regression framework. We
control for own performance rather than for performance beliefs since beliefs might
have been distorted, and this potential distortion is likely to be related to the IAT
score. For instance, subjects who are in general favorable towards refugees are likely
to have a positive IAT score and possibly upwards biased beliefs about a refugee’s
performance.
Table 4.2 reports probit regressions of favorable attribution on IATneg, which
is equal to one if the IAT score is negative (negative associations towards Arabic
names) and zero otherwise (positive associations towards Arabic names), and own
performance. Column (1) includes subjects in Refugee only. As indicated by our
non-parametric results discussed before, we observe a large and significant correlation
Sickening, and Horrible. The IAT for Arabic names can be taken online by visiting https://implicit.
harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html and selecting “Arab-Muslim IAT”.
24The same holds true for average values. The average IAT score for Germans is −0.199, while the
average for refugees is 0.215. This difference is again highly significant (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided).
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between having a negative IAT score and responsibility attribution for Germans
matched with refugees. Those that have negative implicit association towards Arabic
names are 27.2 percentage points less likely to attribute responsibility favorably
to their matched Arabic partner. Column (2) shows that a negative IAT score has
no effect on favorable responsibility attribution in German.25 Column (3) reports
regression results for the entire sample with additional controls and an interaction of
the IAT score and our treatment. The marginal effect of the interaction term of –0.343
indicates that a negative IAT value has a more negative effect on favorable attribution
for participants in Refugee compared to participants in German. Further, we see that
IAT scores (IATneg) do not affect favorable attribution in German. In contrast, having a
negative IAT score decreases the likelihood to attribute responsibility favorably by 25.9
percentage points in Refugee (p = 0.030, F-Test for IATneg + IATneg x Refugee).26 These
results confirm our findings from column (1) and (2). In addition, the coefficient of
Refugee shows that our result of reverse discrimination is mainly driven by participants
with a positive IAT score since the treatment difference is insignificant for subjects
with a negative IAT score (p = 0.390, F-Test for Refugee + IATneg x Refugee).
However, in nonlinear models including interaction terms, interpreting the
marginal effect of the interaction term is flawed (Ai and Norton, 2003) and hypothesis
testing can be misleading (Greene, 2010). This is due to the fact that, in nonlinear
models, the marginal effect of the interaction term is not the same as the cross
25Ex-ante, it is not obvious why the effect of implicit associations should be stronger in Refugee
compared to German. The effects in the two different groups should go into opposite directions, but
there is no apparent reason why positive implicit associations towards one’s ingroup should not lead to
more favorable attribution towards these ingroup members. We interpret this finding in the following
way. First, it is plausible that associations regarding the more salient outgroup determine the IAT
scores. In that case, the IAT score should not predict behavior towards the ingroup. Second, we used a
standard version of the IAT measuring associations towards Arabic names. This version uses a wide
range of Caucasian names in the baseline group. Hence, attitudes towards German participants might
not be perfectly captured by this IAT. This again supports the idea that our IAT scores predominantly
represent implicit associations towards Arabic names and not German names.
26All results from Table 4.2 are qualitatively unchanged if we use the continuous variable of the IAT
instead of the binary version. Only the F-Test for IAT + IAT x Refugee in the interaction model becomes
borderline insignificant (p = 0.143).
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Table 4.2: Favorable responsibility attribution depending
on IAT
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
Refugee German pooled
(1) (2) (3)
IATneg −0.272** 0.089 0.084
(0.114) (0.159) (0.162)
# correct puzzles 0.077** 0.104*** 0.092***
(0.036) (0.024) (0.020)
Refugee 0.395***
(0.146)
IATneg × Refugee −0.343*
(0.186)
Neg shock 0.123**
(0.058)
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 80 72 152
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.071 0.114
Notes: Probit regressions on favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects. Col-
umn (1) and (2) include only the sample of outgroup and ingroup participants respec-
tively. Column (3) includes the entire sample and additional covariates from the ques-
tionnaire: age, semester, and number of experiments so far (all insignificant). Robust and
clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance on
the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
derivative with respect to both interacted variables (the interaction effect). In order
to account for this problem, we compute the predicted values of favorable attribution
split up along two dimensions — having a positive or negative IAT score as well as
being in Refugee or German. We calculate the difference in differences of these four
groups, which reflects the interaction effect in models including interaction terms
with two binary variables. We find that the effect of a negative IAT score on favorable
attribution is 36.19 percentage points lower in Refugee than in German.27 Since this
estimate is very close to the marginal effect of our interaction term in column (3),
–0.343, the mistake induced by interpreting the marginal effect of the interaction term
as interaction effect is negligible in our estimation.
27Estimation of the difference in differences in predicted values can be found in Appendix 4.7.4.
4.3 Results 92
Result 3: Implicit associations directly relate to explicit behavior. Reverse discrimination
is mainly driven by subjects with positive implicit association towards Arabic names.
4.3.4 Alternative Measures of Responsibility Attribution
and Performance Belief
By using the binary measure of responsibility attribution and by enforcing a choice, we
treat more or less indifferent participants the same as those who have a clear opinion
about responsibility. In this section, we want to check whether these indifferent
people could be driving our results. For this purpose, we define two new variables
called (i) responsibility switchpoint and (ii) performance switchpoint based on the two
BDM belief elicitations. These variables indicate probabilistic confidence in (i) the
partner being responsible for a positive shock (conditional on observing a positive
shock) or the partner not being responsible for a negative shock (conditional on a
negative shock) and (ii) the partner having solved four or more puzzles. A higher
value of responsibility switchpoint hence indicates a more favorable attribution. A
higher value of performance switchpoint indicates a higher confidence in the matched
partner having solved four or more puzzles. Both variables, corresponding to the
nine-item choice list, are measured in 10 percentage point steps. Thus, a switchpoint
of one corresponds to assigning 0-10% probability to the event and a switchpoint of
10 corresponds to 90-100%.
The average of responsibility switchpoint by group affiliation highlights a clear
difference to the findings from the binary measure. With an average switchpoint
of 5.65 and 5.56 in German and Refugee respectively, there is no difference in re-
sponsibility attribution by group affiliation. Is this difference in response behavior
driven by outliers, by indifferent participants, or do we observe other inconsistencies?
To understand consistency between the binary and BDM belief elicitation, Table 4.3
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Table 4.3: Contingency table for binary vs. BDM choices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Responsibility:
(1) Binary favorable: Switchpoint 0 2 0 3 21 31 18 11 2 1
(2) Binary unfavorable: Switchpoint 3 2 7 14 16 14 2 4 1 0
Performance:
(3) Binary positive: Switchpoint 0 0 0 3 10 14 23 12 7 2
(4) Binary negative: Switchpoint 3 5 12 21 22 11 2 2 3 0
displays a contingency table for these choices reporting combinations of binary choices
and BDM choices. Row (1) and (2) refer to responsibility consistency, given that
in the binary choice responsibility was assigned favorably (1) or unfavorably (2).
Rows (3) and (4) display consistency for performance beliefs depending on the binary
performance belief elicitation.
If consistent, row (1) subjects should have a responsibility switchpoint above five
and thus assign more than 50% probability to the “favorable” event. Those around the
threshold are close to indifference (highlighted in dark gray), while those in light gray
choose clearly inconsistently. For instance, assigning only 30-40% probability to the
matched partner being responsible for a positive shock but before indicating to believe
the partner is responsible — as is the case for the three participants highlighted in
row (1) in the fourth column — is not consistent. The table shows that a substantial
fraction of participants reports probabilities around the indifference threshold of 5 and
6, indicating that indifference could help to explain our difference in non-parametric
results between our binary and BDM responsibility measures.
Moreover, it seems that some subjects did not understand the BDM choice
list. Twelve participants strongly violate consistency when asked about responsibility,
and ten participants do so for the performance beliefs. In line with the notion of
misunderstanding, it takes these participants also clearly longer to make these BDM
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choices. Those being inconsistent for the performance questions take on average 24
seconds longer (out of 90 seconds they have) for this BDM, while they are 2.5 seconds
faster than the consistent subjects for the binary performance belief (both comparisons
do not exceed a p-value of 0.037, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Directionally, the
same is true for the responsibility questions. Participants that are inconsistent spend
on average 3.5 seconds longer on answering the BDM version of the question, while
they are almost 5 seconds faster for the binary responsibility question.28 Hence, in the
following regression analysis, we exclude those participants that misunderstood the
elicitation procedure.
Table 4.4 reports results from regressions including the alternative measures
of the responsibility and performance beliefs. Again, adding performance beliefs as
controls is crucial since even same levels of responsibility attribution across group
affiliations in the BDM can imply reverse discrimination. This would be the case
if Germans had higher performance beliefs for other Germans than for refugees.
The two-limit Tobit specification of column (1) includes responsibility switchpoint as
dependent variable and the binary performance belief as control variable. We also
control for the direction of shocks. The coefficient for Refugee is positive as before
but now insignificant (p = 0.393), as opposed to in Table 4.1. Hence, also when
controlling for beliefs and shock direction, we do not see a statistically significant
positive effect of being matched with a refugee on responsibility attribution implied by
the BDM elicitation. Using the binary responsibility measure and including non-binary
performance beliefs in column (2), however, results in similar findings as in Table 4.1.
The effect of Refugee is significantly positive. With both switchpoint variables instead
28When designing the experiment, we decided against including control questions to ensure under-
standing of the BDM — as is often done for these complex elicitation procedures. We did not want to
treat refugees and Germans differently because that by itself could have induced a treatment effect,
and explaining the BDM in depth to the refugees would presumably have taken very long.
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Table 4.4: Favorable responsibility attribution with
continuous measures
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3)
Refugee 0.216 0.119** 0.181
(0.318) (0.052) (0.306)
Belief high 0.911***
(0.262)
Switchpoint cutoff 0.113*** 0.356***
(0.011) (0.090)
Neg shock 0.333 0.172*** 0.339
(0.226) (0.047) (0.258)
Constant 4.265*** 2.590**
(0.959) (1.122)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 140 142 131
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.197 0.064
Notes: Column (1) and (3) report two-limit Tobit regressions on responsibility switch-
point. Column (1) includes the binary performance belief indicator belief high, whereas
column (3) includes performance switchpoint. Column (2) reports average marginal ef-
fects of from a probit regression explaining favorable attribution with performance switch-
point. Subjects that clearly misunderstood the BDM elicitations are dropped. All columns
include additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of ex-
periments so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses.
Stars indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of their binary counterparts in column (3), we again observe no significant reverse
discrimination.
How can we explain the insignificant coefficients for the specifications using
responsibility switchpoint? First, even when excluding inconsistent subjects, we still
expect some misunderstanding in the BDM. Especially the BDM for responsibility
attribution is rather difficult to grasp. This increases noise in the data and makes
detecting the effect more difficult.
Second, indifference or only weak binary preferences are important. These
weak inconsistencies, however, are still highly asymmetric. If only indifferent subjects
were responsible for the different results of Table 4.1 and Table 4.4, a substantial
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fraction of Germans matched with a refugee would have to be indifferent and attribute
favorably in the binary elicitation, while those in German and indifferent would
attribute unfavorably. This still is a clear form of reverse discrimination — it would
only be less costly than if it was not driven by indifference. Similarly, other types
of inconsistencies and choice reversals that we cannot categorize could drive the
difference in our findings. We do have some evidence for this type of strong asymmetry
in inconsistencies for the responsibility beliefs. Of the twelve participants being strictly
inconsistent (light grey in upper panel of Table 4.3), five are subjects in German
and all of these switch from unfavorable binary attribution to favorable switchpoint
attribution. In stark contrast to that, of the seven strictly inconsistent Germans in
Refugee, five switch from favorable binary attribution to unfavorable probabilistic
attribution. Despite the very low number of observations, this is a significant difference
(p = 0.028, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). The same is true for weak inconsistencies.
For this purpose, we define those with a switchpoint of 5 in row (1) of Table 4.3
and a switchpoint of 6 in row (2) as being weakly inconsistent. In German, 12 out
of 19 inconsistent subjects change from unfavorable binary to favorable switchpoint
attribution, while only 9 out of 28 do so in Refugee. This difference is again significant
(p = 0.043, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided).
Third, with the BDM it might be more vague what the “right” thing to do
is. If reverse discrimination is driven by self-image and identity concerns, the BDM
elicitation procedure might well not make the identity prescriptions as clear as the
binary elicitation. For the binary responsibility attribution it is obvious what the
subjects should do if they do not want to blame someone. With probabilities this is
less clear.
In summary, we get directionally very similar results with the non-binary belief
elicitations. However, these results are weaker. Increased noise, indifference, system-
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atic inconsistencies, and possibly increased opagueness of the normative prescription
can help explaining this difference. While this provides some additional insights into
individual decision making, it does not change our main message: We observe strongly
asymmetric behavior leading to reverse discrimination and more favorable treatment
of refugees.
Result 4: The evidence for reverse discrimination is weaker when considering non-binary
beliefs. The asymmetry in behavior explaining this difference, however, again points to
strongly group-specific patterns.
4.4 The KleeKandinsky Experiment
In an additional experiment, we only invited participants from the regular subject
pool and applied a minimal group paradigm to analyze whether our result of reverse
discrimination is a general result for in- and outgroups or whether it stems from
our specific groups in the Refugee Experiment. Since groups were formed based on
preferences for paintings of the artists Klee and Kandinsky, henceforth we call this
experiment KleeKandinsky Experiment (and our main experiment Refugee Experiment).
With a total of 142 subjects, we ran six sessions in August 2016. Subjects earned
e13.85 on average, including a e6 fixed payment for showing up on time. Each
subject participated in one session only.
Procedures differed only in dimensions explicitly catered to refugees mentioned
in Section 4.2. Hence, there was no gender restriction for participation, no Arabic
announcements were made, participants only drew seat numbers from one bag, and
group affiliation was communicated via group names (Klee or Kandinsky) instead of
first names. Moreover, every subject is matched with only one other subject. Subjects
in the Ingroup treatment (n = 72) are matched with a subject of the same group,
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Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance for
the KleeKandinsky Experiment. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.6: Favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance in the
KleeKandinsky Experiment
while we match subjects of different groups with each other in the Outgroup treatment
(n = 70).
We employ a modified version of the minimal group paradigm used by Chen and
Li (2009). Subjects evaluate paintings of the artists Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky.
Five pairs of paintings containing each a painting of Klee and Kandinsky are shown.
For each pair and without knowing the artist of the paintings, participants have to
decide which of the two paintings they prefer. Based on a median split in artist
preferences, subjects are assigned to the Klee or Kandinsky group. This assignment
procedure takes place at the very beginning of the experiment.
Contrary to the results of the Refugee Experiment, responsibility attribution is not
affected by group affiliation of the matched partner in the KleeKandinsky Experiment.
Figure 4.6 shows that attribution is more favorable in the Outgroup treatment (light
gray bars), however, this can be explained by beliefs about performance. If anything,
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Table 4.5: Favorable responsibility attribution (KleeKandinsky
Experiment)
Dependent Variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outgroup 0.099** −0.006 0.023 0.010
(0.038) (0.057) (0.061) (0.056)
Belief high 0.392*** 0.336*** 0.345***
(0.079) (0.085) (0.079)
Neg shock 0.258*** 0.248***
(0.057) (0.055)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.141 0.206 0.224
Notes: Probit regressions on binary variable favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects.
Column (4) includes additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, gender, semester, and number
of experiments so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
given rational attribution (dark gray bars), subjects in Outgroup should attribute
responsibility even more favorably and subjects in Ingroup even less favorably. As
can be seen from the intermediate gray bars at the very right, the difference in
performance beliefs can be explained by differences in individual performances.29
Table 4.5 shows the same regression analysis as Table 4.1 does for the Refugee
Experiment. As we already observed in Figure 4.6, in the baseline regression in col-
umn (1), it seems as if there is some form of reverse discrimination. This positive
effect of being matched with an outgroup member is not robust to controlling for
beliefs. The effect of group affiliation becomes a rather precise zero when we control
for performance beliefs (see column (2)). In column (3), we include a dummy for
the direction of the shock. As in the Refugee Experiment, we find that subjects assign
responsibility more favorably after negative shocks. Since shocks were evenly dis-
29Even though individual performances should be orthogonal to treatment assignment, we still see
pronounced differences. Participants in Outgroup solve 4.06 puzzles on average, while participants
in Ingroup only solve 3.36 puzzles on average. This difference is significant (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). Table 4.8 in the Appendix reveals that the sample is balanced otherwise. There are
no differences with respect to age, number of semester, and number of experiments so far.
4.4 The KleeKandinsky Experiment 100
tributed across group affiliation in the KleeKandinsky Experiment,30 we did not expect
to observe an effect on the Outgroup coefficient. This is confirmed by column (3).
Adding more controls in column (4) does not alter the results. Also note that effect
sizes of belief high and neg shock are quite similar to the ones from the Refugee Experi-
ment. Overall, this demonstrates that our finding of reverse discrimination is a result
of our natural group assignment in the Refugee Experiment and not a general result in
our experimental design.
Result 5: There is no evidence for reverse discrimination with artificially assigned
groups.
4.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several explanations for why we find reverse discrimination
in our setting. As we can rule out statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination
is a first natural candidate to look at. Subjects are willing to pay a price to attribute
responsibility favorably towards refugees. In our context, taste-based discrimination
would imply that this is the case because they have some sort of preference for this
group. This explanation seems, however, unlikely. First, participants matched with
refugees do not affect refugees’ payments by attribution behavior. Hence, outcome
based tastes cannot play a role for choices. Second, the same holds for tastes for
interaction. Participants never interact with their matched partner, and responsibility
attribution choices do not affect the degree of interaction. Third, the results of the IAT
reveal that Germans on average have negative implicit associations towards Arabic
names. Lastly, taste-based explanations also stand in stark contrast to the literature
on ingroup favoritism.31
3057% of subjects in Outgroup and 51% in Ingroup receive a positive income shock.
31See, e.g., the literature review by Hewstone et al. (2002).
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The finding of favoring refugees might also be caused by the desire to be seen as
a good person by others. Social image concerns have been shown to be an important
motivation for decisions in various settings where behavior is publicly observable
(e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010).
In our setting, however, subjects take their decisions completely anonymously, which
is common knowledge to our subjects.32 Similarly, our experimental results could
be affected by experimenter demand effects (EDE), that is, in our case, by norm
conformity pressure. While we cannot completely rule out such effects, some consid-
erations render an interpretation of our results predominately based on this pressure
unlikely. Participants could indeed perceive favorable attribution towards refugees
as the appropriate behavior in the eyes of the experimenter. However, EDE should
have also affected behavior of our subjects in German (Refugee Experiment) and in the
KleeKandinsky Experiment. This applies, in particular, to the KleeKandinsky Experiment
because the minimal group paradigm is artificial (as opposed to a more natural identi-
fication based on first names). This should make EDE even more likely as subjects will
think more about the purpose of the study in light of the artificiality (Zizzo, 2010).
In these treatments though, beliefs about performance do not differ from favorable
attribution. That is, behavior is in line with rational responsibility attribution leaving
the Refugee treatment as the only biased sample.33 Importantly, both social image
concerns and norm conformity pressure — if they occurred in our experiment — are
likely to more strongly occur in non-anonymous decision environments. Compared to
actual behavior in the field, our results would then provide a lower bound.
32At the beginning of the experiment, we guarantee our subjects that all of their decisions will be
analyzed anonymously. The experimenter is not present in the laboratory while decisions are taken. In
addition, it is not possible to infer decisions directly from the level of payoffs (which is observed by the
research assistant privately handing out the earned money).
33At the end of the experiment, we further ask for non-incentivized verbal explanations for behavior.
We do not have a single statement that could be related to EDE.
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In addition to being motivated by appearing as a good person in front of
others, one could be motivated by appearing as a good person in front of oneself.
Keeping up a certain identity, a person’s self-view, oftentimes conflicts with profit
maximizing behavior and explains departures thereof in different economic spheres
(e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Mazar et al., 2008). This can also lead to deliberately
distorted beliefs, i.e., motivated beliefs (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 2016;
Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). Agents with such motivated beliefs have a
positive willingness to pay for keeping up a specific self-image. We find that our
subjects make choices that are in line with behaving “politically correct”. Especially
with regard to our student subject pool, it seems to be plausible that being open and
tolerant towards minorities is part of our subjects’ identity. In order to keep up a
positive self-view, they seem to be reluctant to blame refugees. There is some evidence
from psychology supporting such reasoning. Dutton (1973) finds that middle-class
Canadian whites donate more when the solicitor is of black or Indian ethnicity as
compared to when the solicitor is white. With donors perceiving black people and
Indians to be targets of discrimination, the author interprets the results as supportive
evidence for a specific type of revealed reverse discrimination. In addition, Byrd et al.
(2015) show that liberal and moderate whites favor black over white politicians in an
artificial setting. Participants read political speeches and saw a picture of either a black
or a white person who was supposed to have given the speech. Among other outcome
variables, more participants indicated that they would vote for a black politician. The
evidence of these studies suggests that actively avoiding explicit discrimination might
be part of the identity of politically liberal and moderate middle-class people to which
the majority of our subjects should belong to. This explanation is also in line with
the stronger results for the binary responsibility beliefs compared to the finer-graded
probability beliefs. In the former elicitation, it is absolutely clear what the “good” or
“bad” thing to do is. Hence, our subjects try to avoid taking the bad action towards
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the refugees.34 In contrast, “good” and “bad” is not as clearly defined for the latter
elicitation procedure. We therefore argue that motivated belief formation is the most
plausible explanation for our main result.
4.6 Conclusion
We experimentally study responsibility attribution for negative and positive income
shocks. In particular, we ask whether there is asymmetric attribution of responsibility,
depending on whether a German participant is matched with another German or a
refugee. In our setting, there is imperfect information regarding the source of the
shock. It can either be due to a random draw or due to the performance of the
matched participant. This experimental paradigm is an abstract setting related to
several environments in the field. Oftentimes, there is uncertainty with regard to
what or who is responsible for a certain outcome. Group-specific behavior can thus
strongly impact the lives of different societal groups. Prominent examples relate to
labor market settings, where people that are discriminated against in responsibility
attribution will be strongly disadvantaged. This might occur in the hiring process
or at later stages in promotion, job assignment, or bonus decisions. Our study also
relates on a more aggregate level to how developments and outcomes for the society
as a whole might be related to groups of people. Recent examples are the strongly
debated effects of refugees on crime, economic prospects of societies, and cultural
developments. The negative shock of rising crime rates in some European countries
might be indeed (in part) caused by the influx of refugees (as suggested by Donald
34We further assume that there is a clear difference in moral prescriptions between stating perfor-
mance beliefs and responsibility beliefs. While it should be perceived a good (bad) thing to praise
(blame) for responsibility, there should be no such moral connotation to stating mere performance
beliefs. This is why we expect to observe distorted (discriminating) responsibility attribution and rather
unbiased performance beliefs.
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Trump’s quote at the beginning of this chapter) but could also be due to many other
factors.
Surprisingly and contrary to the literature, which predominantly documents
ingroup favoritism, we find no discrimination against refugees in responsibility at-
tribution. Importantly, refugees are clearly not blamed for negative events but less
often held responsible when a negative shock occurs. That is, we observe reverse
discrimination. German participants generally attribute responsibility to refugees
more favorably as compared to other Germans. We put forward an explanation based
on identity concerns and motivated beliefs. Participants want to view themselves as
non-xenophobic and tolerant and hence distort attribution as to not conflict with this
identity. This belief distortion consequently leads to reverse discrimination. Com-
paring these results to an experiment with artificial group assignment, we show that
our results are not a general result for in- and outgroups but rather depend on our
specific sample. This lends support to the idea that the refugee sample indeed induces
identity concerns. Furthermore, implicit associations of our German participants
towards Arabic names are negative, while responsibility attribution is irrationally
favorable on average. This suggests that favoring refugees is a conscious choice in our
experiment. Moreover, we find that subjects with more positive associations towards
Arabic names attribute responsibility more favorably to them. Implicit associations —
which are correlated with important field behavior such as hiring decisions — thus
predict responsibility attribution in a meaningful way.
The evidence for reverse discrimination towards refugees together with our re-
sults on potential mechanisms provide fruitful avenues for future research. First, while
we find strong evidence in the domain of responsibility attribution, our study cannot
draw conclusions about whether our finding for the natural outgroup of refugees
translates into other domains of discrimination such as trust or social preferences.
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Second, our sample of university students (in Munich) is not representative for the
population (of Germany). This has implications for the generalizability of our results.
Similar studies with more right-wing and less liberal subpopulations might yield
different results. Hence, testing our findings with different subject pools can yield
additional insights — especially with regards to the effect of identity concerns. Future
research could also exogenously vary identity concerns by priming certain aspects of
subjects’ identities. This could help to establish a causal link between these concerns
and discrimination behavior. Lastly, the difference between our findings in the binary
versus the probability-scale responsibility attribution highlight a potentially mediating
effect of moral prescriptions. Using a range of choice environments that differ in the
strength of behavioral prescriptions could test this relationship.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Refugee Recruiting Details
Refugees were recruited by distributing the leaflet shown in Figure 4.7. The actual
first names of the refugees taking part in the experiment and which were visible to the
matched partner were: Abdo, Abduh, Abdullah (2x), Adnan, Ahmad (3x), Alaa, Ali,
Alkhder, Almhklf, Amjad, Anas, Bshr, Firas, Ghassan, Ghiath, Giwan, Hafez, Hasan,
Khaled (2x), Louay, Mazen (2x), Mohamad, Mohamd, Mohammad, Mohammed
(3x), Mounir, Nizar, Obaida, Odai, Omar, Sabri, Saleem, Schindar, Wissam, Yazan,
Youssef.
Figure 4.7: Leaflet for recruiting refugees (translated from Arabic)
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The names of the German participants were: Aleksandar, Alex, Alexander (3x),
Aljoscha, Andi, Andreas (2x), Axel, Ben, Benedikt, Benjamin, Benno, Bernhard,
Caspar, Chris, Christian (3x), Christoph, Christopher, Daniel (4x), David (4x), Dominic,
Dominik (2x), Eric, Fabian (7x), Felix (3x), Fiete, Florian (2x), Franz, Franziskus,
Fridtjof, Gregor, Ion, Jan, Jan Fedor, Jens, Joel, Johannes (4x), Jonas (3x), Jonathan
(2x), Josaphat, Julian (3x), Kevin, Konstantin (2x), Korbinian (2x), Laurian, Lennart,
Leon, Leonard, Lion, Louis, Lukas (2x), Manuel, Marcus (3x), Marian, Marius (4x),
Markus (3x), Martin (2x), Matthias (5x), Maurus, Max (5x), Maximilian (3x), Michael
(4x), Moritz, Niclas, Niklas, Niko, Oswald, Pascal, Patrick, Paul, Philipp (4x), Raffael,
Richie, Roman, Sebastian (3x), Simon, Stefan (3x), Steffen, Stephan (2x), Thomas
(3x), Tilman, Tim, Timo, Tobi, Tobias (3x), Tom, Valentin, Vincent.
4.7.2 Puzzle Motives
The selected motives for the puzzles are pictures of a range of colors, a bird, a beach,
a lamb, a tree in a desert, a sunset over the ocean, a water drop, and a box of bananas.
They are displayed in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Puzzle motives for real effort task
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4.7.3 Supplementary Results
4.7.3.1 Responsibility Attribution by Shock
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Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution and rational attribution for both treatments
divided by shock direction. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.9: Favorable attribution and rational attribution by shock direction
Figure 4.9 shows actual attribution behavior and counterfactual rational attribution
based on performance beliefs for both group affiliations by shock direction. Even
though, at first glance, it looks as if behavior in Refugee after a negative shock drives
reverse discrimination, comparing behavior across the two group affiliation shows
that the difference in difference is rather similar for both shocks. After a negative
shock, participants in Refugees deviate by 0.288 from rational attribution, while those
in German attribute responsibility more favorably by 0.053. This is a difference in
difference of 0.235. After a positive shock, the deviation for participants in Refugees is
0.095 and -0.088 in German. Hence, the difference in difference sums up to 0.183,
and is therefore close to 0.235 after a negative shock.
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4.7.3.2 Balance Table Cond vs. Uncond
Table 4.6: Balance table Refugee Experiment (Cond
vs. Uncond)
Cond Uncond (1) vs. (2)
(1) (2) p-value
Own performance 0.368 0.579 0.009
Age 22.474 23.303 0.160
Semester 4.224 4.553 0.534
Number of experiments so far 5.461 8.250 0.021
Notes: Own performance indicates whether a subject solved four or more puzzles.
4.7.3.3 Regression Analysis Controlling for Own Performance
Table 4.7 reports results from regressions equivalent to our main regressions in
Table 4.1 (Section 4.3.1) only using the number of correctly solved puzzles as control
variable instead of performance beliefs directly.
Table 4.7: Favorable responsibility attribution (controlling for own
performance)
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee 0.160*** 0.181*** 0.144*** 0.139***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.047) (0.044)
# correct puzzles 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.091***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Neg shock 0.159** 0.148**
(0.063) (0.064)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 152 152 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.062 0.081 0.090
Notes: Probit regressions on binary variable Favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects.
Column (4) includes additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of ex-
periments so far (all insignificant). Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in paren-
theses. Stars indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.7.3.4 Balance Table for the KleeKandinsky Experiment
Table 4.8: Balance table KleeKandinsky Experiment
Ingroup Outgroup (1) vs. (2)
(1) (2) p-value
Own performance 0.514 0.686 0.037
Age 24.875 24.729 0.842
Semester 5.736 5.129 0.220
Number of experiments so far 10.542 11.700 0.401
Notes: Own performance indicates whether a subject solved four or more puzzles.
4.7.4 Interaction Effect of IAT Score and Being Matched
with a Refugee
For estimating the interaction effect between having a negative IAT score and our
treatment, we compute predictive values for favorable attribution by using probit
regression estimates from model (3) used in Table 4.2 for the following four groups:
• Subjects in Refugee with a negative IAT score:
P (Y = 1|Refugee = 1, IAT < 0, X)
∧
= 0.5862
• Subjects in Refugee with a positive IAT score:
(Y = 1|Refugee = 1, IAT > 0, X) = 0.8375
• Subjects in German with a negative IAT score:
P (Y = 1|Refugee = 0, IAT < 0, X)
∧
= 0.5295
• Subjects in German with a positive IAT score:
P (Y = 1|Refugee = 0, IAT > 0, X) = 0.4189
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This leaves us with a difference in differences of –0.3619 ([0.5862 – 0.8375] – [0.5295
– 0.4189]). Thus, the effect of having a negative IAT score on favorable attribution is
36.19 percentage points lower in Refugee than in German.
4.7.5 Instructions
The following passages are the instructions for Cond translated from German. Text in
italics refers to instructions read out aloud by the experimenter (alternating one of the
two authors), which were repeated in Arabic. Text in brackets indicates self-explaining
comments. Text in normal letters refers to instruction that the subjects read on screen
(either in German or Arabic).
[upon arrival at the laboratory]
Hello everybody. We provide refugees with the possibility to take part in a series of
experiments. This is why there are refugees among the participants today. In order to
assign you to the seat with the correct language [experimenter points at the two bags
labeled with “German” or “Arabic”] Arabic-speaking participants draw a card with a
seat number from the bag with the label Arabic and German-speaking participants a card
from the bag with the label German.
[in the laboratory after seating took place]
Welcome to MELESSA. Thank you very much for showing up to this experiment on time.
My name is Felix Klimm/Stefan Grimm, and I will conduct this experiment today.
Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment.
For the sake of simplicity, you find the instructions on your screen. The instructions are
the same for all participants. Please follow the instructions. If you have any questions,
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please raise your hand or press the red button on your keyboard. We will then come to
you and answer your question in private.
[first screen]
General Procedures I
This experiment is meant to study economic decision making. It will last about 1 hour.
You can earn money during the experiment. This money will be paid to you in private
after the experiment. You will make decisions in this study. These decisions will
affect your payment. In addition, your payment might depend on other participant’s
decisions as well as on chance. Further rules will be explained to you right before each
decision. Hence, today’s payment is the sum of money earned with your decisions
plus e6 for showing up on time.
[new screen]
General Procedures II
The experiment consists of 2 parts. You will see the instructions for each part right
before the respective part starts. Data from this experiment will be analyzed anony-
mously. At the end of the experiment, you will have to sign a receipt. This is only for
accounting purposes.
[new screen]
Part 1
In part 1 of the experiment, you need to perform a task. You receive e3 for performing
this task. Your task is to correctly solve as many puzzles as possible. This task is suited
for everybody as puzzles are well known in most parts of the world. For this purpose,
there are 8 puzzles next to your keyboard. You are allowed to start as soon as we tell
you to do so. After 10 minutes, you need to stop, and we will count the number of
correct puzzles. There will be a clock on your screen displaying the remaining time.
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Click on OK if you understand the procedure. Please still wait with solving a puzzle
until we tell you to start.
[Subjects perform real effort and the experimenter and student research assistants
checks the number of correctly solved puzzles.]
[new screen]
Part 2
You are now matched with another participant. Please enter your first name for this
purpose. Thereafter, the first name of your matched participant will be shown to you.
Your matched participant will see your first name.
Your first name: own name
[new screen]
Your matched participant is: name partner
[new screen]
Your payoff might depend on your matched participant’s decisions. Reminder: Your
matched participant isname partner. In the following, you can receive additional
e5 or lose e5. Whether you are receiving or losing e5 depends on chance or the
other participant. First, the computer will determine via a virtual coin flip whether
chance or the other participant is responsible for your payment. Both cases are equally
likely (50/50). Hence, there are 2 possibilities:
1. If chance is responsible, you will receive e5 with 50% probability. Hence, a coin
will be flipped again.
2. Ifname partner is responsible, the number of puzzles thatname partner
solved correctly in part 1 will determine whether you receive or lose e5. Ifname
partner solved at least 4 puzzles, you will receive e5. Ifname partner solved
fewer than 4 puzzles, you will lose e5.
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The graph below illustrates the procedure.
Chance:
Coin toss
Chance:
Coin toss
at least 4 puzzles?
€5 received
€5 lost
€5 received
€5 lost
[new screen]
You will know about your payment in a second. However, you will not know whether
chance orname partner is responsible for this payment.
Please answer four test questions in order to be sure that you understand the proce-
dure.
[new screen]
1. Ifname partner solved at least 4 puzzles, will you receive e5 in any case?
2. If name partner solved 3 or fewer puzzles and chance was selected to be
responsible for your payment, how likely is it that you will receive e5?
3. If chance was selected to be relevant for your payment, does your payment depend
on the number of correctly solved puzzles byname partner in this case?
4. How much lower will your payment be if you lose e5 compared to the case in
which you receive e5?
[new screen]
You have answered all the questions correctly. On the next screen you will see whether
you receive or lose e5.
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[new screen]
Your income:
Reminder: The computer randomly determined whether chance orname partner
is relevant for your payment. According to these rules:
You receive/lose e5.
[new screen]
We now ask you to answer 4 questions. One of the questions will be randomly selected
at the end of the experiment. You will then receive payment according to your answer
to this question.
[new screen]
Question 1
Do you believe that chance orname partner was responsible for your payment?
If your answer is correct and this questions will be selected to be payoff relevant, you
receive e5.
[new screen]
Question 2
You will now make a sequence of decisions. Each of the decisions contains 2 options —
A and B. Both options give you once more the chance to receive another e5.
One of the 9 rows will be randomly chosen for payment if question 2 will be payoff
relevant.
If you choose option A in one of the 9 rows, you will receive e5 ifname partner /
chance [name of partner or chance displayed depending on the answer to Question
1 — name of the partner displayed if subject indicated that the partner is responsible]
was responsible for your payment.
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If you choose option B, you will receive e5 with a certain probability. This probability
varies from 10 to 90 percent and is shown to you next to every decision.
If question 2 is payoff relevant, one of your 9 decisions will be implemented. The
computer will randomly select which decision will be implemented in this case.
Please consider now from which probability on (which row) you want to choose
option B. If you took your decision, click on OK.
Option A You receive e5 ifname partner / chance [here, again, name of partner
or chance displayed depending on the answer to Question 1] was responsible for your
payment.
Option B You receive e5 with a probability of 10% ... 90%.
[new screen]
Question 3
Do you believe thatname partner solved at least 4 puzzles? Hence, did he solve
4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 puzzles?
If your answer is correct and this questions will be selected to be payoff relevant, you
receive additional e5.
[new screen]
Question 4
In question 4 — like in question 2 — you will make a sequence of decisions. Each
of the decisions contains 2 options — A and B. Both options give you the chance to
receive another e5.
One of the 9 rows will be randomly chosen for payment if question 4 will be payoff
relevant.
If you choose option A in one of the 9 rows, you will receive e5 ifname partner
solved at least 4 puzzles.
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If you choose option B, you will receive e5 with a certain probability. This probability
varies from 10 to 90 percent and is shown to you next to every decision.
If question 4 is payoff relevant, one of your 9 decisions will be implemented. The
computer will randomly select which decision will be implemented in this case.
Please consider now from which probability on (which row) you want to choose
option B. If you took your decision, click on OK.
Option A You receive e5 ifname partner solved at least 4 puzzles.
Option B You receive e5 with a probability of 10% ... 90%.
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